Meridia is a small open economy that imports specialty steel at the world price. Its purchases are too small to influence that price. To protect domestic manufacturers, the government imposes a tariff on each imported unit. The tariff raises the domestic price by the full amount of the tariff. Analysts are instructed to assume linear domestic supply and demand curves and to ignore administrative costs and foreign retaliation. Exhibit 1 reports the resulting production, consumption, and import changes. Meridia is separately negotiating a free-trade agreement with Countries A and B. The two countries use labour to produce solar panels and furniture, and labour is homogeneous within each country. The hours required to produce each good are shown in Exhibit 1. A trade economist advises the negotiating team to base specialization recommendations on opportunity costs rather than solely on absolute labour productivity. Cross-border investment is also increasing. Norial Manufacturing, a company based outside Meridia, acquires 15% of the voting shares of a Meridian advanced-materials producer and receives one seat on its board. Norial states that it intends to maintain the investment and participate in strategic decisions. In a separate transaction, an international mutual fund purchases 2% of the same producer's nonvoting shares solely to earn capital gains and dividends. Neither transaction is undertaken by a central bank or another official monetary authority. Meridia has also become concerned that advanced semiconductors exported by its domestic firms could be incorporated into foreign weapons systems. The government requires exporters to obtain licenses before selling specified semiconductor designs to designated foreign purchasers. The policy does not involve military deployment, diplomatic recognition, or a change in formal alliances. Government officials describe the restriction as an instrument for advancing national-security objectives through control of strategically important commercial technology.
Trade and Investment Data
| Measure | Country A | Country B | |---|---:|---:| | Labour hours required for one unit of solar panels | 2 | 4 | | Labour hours required for one unit of furniture | 6 | 8 | | Tariff-market measure | Units | |---|---:| | Tariff per imported unit | USD 10 | | Increase in domestic production | 20 | | Decrease in domestic consumption | 30 | | Imports after the tariff | 70 |
- Q2.1
Based on Exhibit 1, comparative advantage in solar panels is held by:
- ACountry B in solar panels
- BCountry A in solar panels
- CNeither country in solar panels
Show answer and rationale
Answer: B. Country A in solar panels
Rationale
Country A in solar panels
- In Exhibit 1, producing one solar panel costs Country A 2/6 = 1/3 of a furniture unit in forgone production.
- Country B gives up 4/8 = 1/2 of a furniture unit, so Country A has the lower opportunity cost.
Country B in solar panels
- Country B’s opportunity cost of one solar panel is 1/2 of a furniture unit, higher than Country A’s 1/3.
- Comparative advantage belongs to the country with the lower opportunity cost, not the country with the higher one.
Neither country in solar panels
- The opportunity costs differ: Country A gives up 1/3 of a furniture unit per solar panel, while Country B gives up 1/2.
- Country A’s use of fewer labour hours for both goods does not prevent it from also having a comparative advantage in solar panels.
- Q2.2
Using Exhibit 1, what is the magnitude of Meridia's net welfare loss (deadweight loss) from the steel tariff?
- AUSD 100
- BUSD 150
- CUSD 250
Show answer and rationale
Answer: C. USD 250
Rationale
USD 250
- Exhibit 1 gives a production loss of 0.5 × USD 10 × 20 = USD 100.
- The consumption loss is 0.5 × USD 10 × 30 = USD 150, bringing total deadweight loss to USD 250.
USD 100
- This is only the production-loss triangle: 0.5 × USD 10 × 20 = USD 100.
- Omitting the consumption-loss triangle leaves out USD 150 of the tariff’s net welfare loss.
USD 150
- This is only the consumption-loss triangle: 0.5 × USD 10 × 30 = USD 150.
- Omitting the production-loss triangle leaves out USD 100 of the tariff’s net welfare loss.
- Q2.3
Norial's acquisition of a 15% voting interest in the Meridian advanced-materials producer is best classified as:
- AForeign direct investment
- BForeign portfolio investment
- COfficial reserve investment
Show answer and rationale
Answer: A. Foreign direct investment
Rationale
Foreign direct investment
- Norial acquires 15% of voting shares, exceeding the 10% voting-power threshold commonly used to identify foreign direct investment.
- Its board seat and stated intention to participate in strategic decisions support a lasting interest in the Meridian producer.
Foreign portfolio investment
- Portfolio investment is generally held for financial returns without the influence indicated by Norial’s voting stake and board seat.
- The international mutual fund’s separate purchase of 2% of nonvoting shares for dividends and capital gains fits this classification instead.
Official reserve investment
- Official reserve investment involves assets held by a central bank or other monetary authority, not a private manufacturer’s acquisition.
- Norial’s purchase is not undertaken by an official monetary authority, so its voting interest cannot be classified as a reserve investment.
- Q2.4
Meridia's semiconductor export-license requirement is best described as:
- AA diplomatic instrument
- BAn economic instrument
- CA military instrument
Show answer and rationale
Answer: B. An economic instrument
Rationale
An economic instrument
- Meridia uses export licenses to control sales of specified semiconductor designs to designated foreign purchasers.
- Restricting trade in strategically important commercial technology is an economic instrument, even when the objective is national security.
A diplomatic instrument
- The requirement controls commercial exports rather than conducting negotiations, granting recognition, or changing alliances.
- The stem explicitly states that the policy involves no diplomatic recognition or change in formal alliances.
A military instrument
- Concern that the semiconductors could be used in foreign weapons does not make the licensing requirement a military action.
- Meridia uses trade controls, not military deployment or armed force.
Show case rationale
Rationale
The trade conclusions depend on opportunity cost and the two welfare-loss triangles.
- Country A gives up 1/3 unit of furniture per solar panel, versus 1/2 unit in Country B, so A has comparative advantage in solar panels.
- Exhibit 1 gives Meridia a tariff deadweight loss of USD 250: ½ × USD 10 × (20 additional units produced + 30 units no longer consumed).
The investment and security conclusions depend on influence and the instrument used.
- Norial’s 15% voting stake, board seat, and intended participation in decisions make its acquisition foreign direct investment; the fund’s 2% nonvoting stake is portfolio investment.
- Requiring licenses for semiconductor exports controls commercial technology to pursue a security objective, making it an economic instrument.
Traps in this case
Using absolute productivity to assign comparative advantage
- Country A uses fewer hours for both goods, but its lower opportunity cost—not productivity alone—establishes its solar-panel advantage.
Counting only one tariff-loss triangle
- The production triangle is USD 100 (½ × 10 × 20), and the consumption triangle is USD 150 (½ × 10 × 30); both contribute to the USD 250 loss.
Confusing the purpose of an action with its classification
- A national-security purpose does not make an export-license restriction a military or diplomatic instrument, just as a cross-border share purchase is not an official reserve transaction without an official monetary authority.