International Trade — MCQs

International Trade — MCQs

International Trade — MCQs

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6 questions
3 chapters
Q1Easy

An economist observes that average weekly manufacturing hours have fallen before aggregate output has declined. The series is best classified as a:

Q2Unfolding case study

Northstar Investments is assessing trade opportunities involving Ardin and Belvar. Both countries can produce wine and cloth using labor as the only input, and labor is mobile between industries within each country but not between countries. Transportation costs are zero, product quality is identical across countries, and the unit labor requirements in Exhibit 1 are constant over the relevant production range. Northstar's economist emphasizes that the direction of trade should be based on relative opportunity costs rather than on which country uses fewer labor hours in absolute terms. Ardin also imports steel at the world price. Because Ardin is a small country in the global steel market, changes in its imports do not affect the world price. Domestic steel producers have requested protection, arguing that either a tariff or a quota would raise domestic production and reduce imports. The government is comparing the LCU10-per-tonne tariff with an import quota calibrated to generate the same domestic price and quantity effects. The two measures differ in who receives the associated government revenue or scarcity rents. The proposed allocation of quota licenses is described in Exhibit 2. Northstar initially classified Ardin as a stable destination for foreign direct investment. New developments have changed that assessment. Ardin's government has announced that strategic mineral assets may be transferred to state ownership without a specified compensation process. It is also considering restrictions on converting local-currency proceeds into foreign currency. At the same time, a state-linked group has conducted cyberattacks against logistics companies in neighboring countries. No armed conflict has begun, but several multinational companies have delayed planned investments while reviewing the enforceability of contracts and their ability to repatriate cash flows. A Northstar analyst argues that the absence of military conflict means the developments should not affect valuation discount rates. The senior economist responds that geopolitical risk includes political, economic, and technological instruments as well as conventional military action. Investors may therefore demand compensation for a greater probability of expropriation, interruption, or capital immobility. Northstar is instructed to evaluate the likely direction of required returns and foreign direct investment without assuming that the adverse developments are already reflected in asset prices. Each question should be answered using the stated small-country assumptions, the license-allocation procedure, the labor data, and the described geopolitical developments. No retaliatory trade measures or offsetting investment guarantees are expected.

Unit Labor Requirements

| Country | One unit of wine | One unit of cloth | |---|---:|---:| | Ardin | 2 labor hours | 6 labor hours | | Belvar | 4 labor hours | 8 labor hours |

Proposed Trade Measures

Ardin is a small importing country that cannot affect the world price. The world price of imported steel is LCU100 per tonne. The government is considering either a tariff of LCU10 per tonne or an import quota producing the same domestic price and import quantity. Under the quota, licenses would be allocated without charge by the exporting country's government to its exporters.

  1. Q2.1

    If Ardin adopts the tariff in Exhibit 2, the domestic welfare effects most likely include:

    1. AConsumer surplus rises and government revenue falls
    2. BConsumer surplus rises and government revenue rises
    3. CConsumer surplus falls and government revenue rises
    Show answer and rationale

    Answer: C. Consumer surplus falls and government revenue rises

    Rationale

    Consumer surplus falls and government revenue rises

    • The LCU10 tariff raises Ardin’s domestic steel price from LCU100 to LCU110 per tonne, reducing consumer surplus.
    • As a small country, Ardin cannot change the world price, so its government collects LCU10 per imported tonne while imports continue.

    Consumer surplus rises and government revenue falls

    • Consumers pay LCU110 rather than LCU100 per tonne, so their surplus falls rather than rises.
    • Revenue does not fall: the tariff pays Ardin’s government, whereas the proposed quota would give licenses without charge to foreign exporters.

    Consumer surplus rises and government revenue rises

    • The revenue effect is right because Ardin’s government collects LCU10 per imported tonne.
    • The consumer effect is reversed: a higher domestic price reduces, rather than increases, consumer surplus.
  2. Q2.2

    Under the quota-license arrangement in Exhibit 2, the quota rents will most likely accrue to:

    1. AArdin's steel consumers
    2. BForeign steel exporters
    3. CArdin's government
    Show answer and rationale

    Answer: B. Foreign steel exporters

    Rationale

    Foreign steel exporters

    • Exhibit 2 says the exporting country’s government gives quota licenses without charge to its exporters, so those exporters receive the quota rents.
    • The quota has the same price effect as the LCU10 tariff: Ardin’s steel price rises from LCU100 to LCU110 per tonne, creating a LCU10-per-tonne rent on licensed imports.

    Ardin's steel consumers

    • Ardin’s consumers pay the higher LCU110-per-tonne domestic price; they do not hold the import licenses that capture the rent.
    • The quota therefore raises their steel costs rather than giving them the LCU10-per-tonne difference between domestic and world prices.

    Ardin's government

    • Ardin’s government would collect revenue under the LCU10-per-tonne tariff, but Exhibit 2 specifies a quota instead.
    • It does not auction the quota licenses or receive the scarcity rents because the licenses are given to foreign exporters without charge.
  3. Q2.3

    Comparing the tariff and the quota described in Exhibit 2, which statement is most accurate?

    1. AThe tariff generates revenue for Ardin's government, while the quota's rents accrue to foreign exporters
    2. BThe quota generates revenue for Ardin's government, while the tariff's rents accrue to foreign exporters
    3. CBoth measures generate revenue that accrues to Ardin's government
    Show answer and rationale

    Answer: A. The tariff generates revenue for Ardin's government, while the quota's rents accrue to foreign exporters

    Rationale

    The tariff generates revenue for Ardin's government, while the quota's rents accrue to foreign exporters

    • Exhibit 2’s LCU10-per-tonne tariff raises Ardin’s domestic steel price from LCU100 to LCU110 and gives Ardin’s government LCU10 for each tonne imported.
    • The quota has the same price and quantity effects, but its licenses are allocated without charge to foreign exporters, who receive the LCU10-per-tonne scarcity rent.

    The quota generates revenue for Ardin's government, while the tariff's rents accrue to foreign exporters

    • Ardin’s government does not collect quota revenue because Exhibit 2 assigns the licenses without charge to foreign exporters.
    • The tariff payment goes to Ardin’s government, not to foreign exporters.

    Both measures generate revenue that accrues to Ardin's government

    • The tariff generates government revenue of LCU10 per imported tonne.
    • The quota generates scarcity rents instead, and Exhibit 2’s license allocation gives those rents to foreign exporters, not Ardin’s government.
  4. Q2.4

    Northstar's revised geopolitical assessment most likely implies which response by foreign investors?

    1. ALower required returns and greater direct investment
    2. BUnchanged required returns and unchanged direct investment
    3. CHigher required returns and reduced direct investment
    Show answer and rationale

    Answer: C. Higher required returns and reduced direct investment

    Rationale

    Higher required returns and reduced direct investment

    • Ardin’s possible uncompensated transfer of mineral assets to state ownership and restrictions on currency conversion increase expropriation and repatriation risk, so foreign investors are likely to require higher returns.
    • State-linked cyberattacks add disruption risk, and several multinational companies have already delayed planned investments while reviewing contracts and cash repatriation.

    Lower required returns and greater direct investment

    • These developments weaken, rather than strengthen, investors’ confidence in recovering their assets and converting local-currency proceeds.
    • With no offsetting investment guarantees expected, greater geopolitical risk does not support lower required returns or more direct investment.

    Unchanged required returns and unchanged direct investment

    • Geopolitical risk is not limited to armed conflict; Ardin’s proposed ownership and currency measures can affect investors even though no armed conflict has begun.
    • The reported investment delays and the instruction not to assume the risks are already priced undermine a prediction of no change in required returns or investment.
Show case rationale

Rationale

The steel tariff and quota have the same domestic price and import quantity effects, but their proceeds go to different recipients.

  • As a small importer, Ardin faces an unchanged world steel price of LCU100; the LCU10 tariff raises its domestic price to LCU110, reducing consumer surplus and generating government revenue on imports.
  • The equivalent quota creates scarcity rents, but the exporting country gives licenses to its exporters without charge, so those rents accrue to foreign exporters rather than Ardin’s government.

Ardin’s geopolitical developments increase investment risk even without armed conflict.

  • Possible uncompensated state ownership transfers, currency-conversion restrictions, and state-linked cyberattacks raise the risk of lost assets, immobile cash flows, or disruption.
  • Without assuming these risks are already priced in, foreign investors would likely require higher returns and reduce direct investment.

Traps in this case

Treating protection as a gain for steel consumers

  • Both measures raise Ardin’s domestic steel price above LCU100, so consumer surplus falls, not rises.

Treating quota rents as tariff revenue

  • A tariff pays Ardin’s government LCU10 per imported tonne, whereas the specified free quota licenses give the associated rents to foreign exporters.

Treating the absence of war as the absence of geopolitical risk

  • The threatened asset transfers and conversion restrictions can affect required returns and investment even though no armed conflict has begun.
Q3Easy

An economist seeking evidence of an approaching recovery should most likely emphasize which observed change?

Q4Easy

A government restricts exports of a critical mineral to pressure another state into changing its foreign policy. This action best represents:

Q5Unfolding case study

Daniel Cho is a currency strategist at Atlas Global Investors. The firm's base currency is USD, but its portfolios hold securities denominated in EUR, JPY, and GBP. Cho is reviewing spot quotations, expected real-return differentials, and a proposed trade restriction that could affect portfolio companies. Atlas uses the market convention A/B to mean units of currency B per one unit of currency A. Thus, EUR/USD is quoted as USD per EUR. Unless stated otherwise, transaction costs, taxes, and bid–ask spreads are ignored. Cho must calculate cross-rates directly from the contemporaneous spot quotations in Exhibit 1; no forward points or expected exchange-rate changes are required for that calculation. For a separate capital-flow assessment, Cho applies the approximate Fisher relation, under which the ex ante real interest rate equals the nominal interest rate minus expected inflation. He assumes equal default risk, equal liquidity, no capital controls, and unchanged currency risk premiums across the three economies. The assessment is intended to identify the direction suggested by real interest-rate differentials, not to forecast the exact amount of capital movement or the subsequent exchange-rate adjustment. Cho also evaluates a proposed US restriction on steel imported from Solandia. Before the restriction, steel can be imported at the world price. The proposed quota would reduce permitted imports below the free-trade quantity, making the restriction binding. Domestic US steel producers have upward-sloping supply, US consumers have downward-sloping demand, and the quota does not generate an offsetting improvement in the US terms of trade. The allocation of import licences is described in Exhibit 3. An associate makes two claims. First, she states that a cross-rate can always be calculated by multiplying the two displayed spot quotations without checking the units. Second, she states that a quota and a tariff create identical recipients of government revenue. Cho cautions that currencies must cancel correctly in a cross-rate calculation and that the distribution of quota rents depends on how import licences are allocated. He further notes that although trade restrictions may benefit protected domestic producers, those benefits do not establish a net national welfare gain under the assumptions supplied.

Spot Foreign-Exchange Quotes

| Currency pair | Spot quote | |---|---:| | EUR/USD | 1.1200 USD per EUR | | USD/JPY | 150.00 JPY per USD | | GBP/USD | 1.2800 USD per GBP |

One-Year Interest Rates and Expected Inflation

| Economy | One-year nominal interest rate | Expected inflation | |---|---:|---:| | Euro area | 2.0% | 1.5% | | United States | 4.5% | 2.5% | | Japan | 0.5% | 1.0% |

Proposed Trade Restriction

The United States is considering a binding import quota on Solandian steel. Import licences would be granted without charge to selected US importing firms. Solandia is assumed to be a small exporting country relative to the US steel market, and no retaliatory policy is expected.

  1. Q5.1

    Based on Exhibit 1, the calculated GBP/JPY cross-rate expressed as GBP per JPY is closest to:

    1. A0.0052 GBP per JPY
    2. B0.0085 GBP per JPY
    3. C0.0067 GBP per JPY
    Show answer and rationale

    Answer: A. 0.0052 GBP per JPY

    Rationale

    0.0052 GBP per JPY

    • Exhibit 1 gives 1.2800 USD per GBP and 150.00 JPY per USD, so multiplying with USD cancelling gives 192.00 JPY per GBP.
    • Inverting 192.00 JPY per GBP gives 1 ÷ 192.00 = 0.0052083 GBP per JPY, closest to 0.0052.

    0.0085 GBP per JPY

    • Dividing 1.2800 by 150.00 gives 0.0085333, which rounds to 0.0085.
    • That division is a quote-direction error: the USD units in Exhibit 1 cancel when the quotations are multiplied, not divided.

    0.0067 GBP per JPY

    • Inverting Exhibit 1’s USD/JPY quote alone gives 1 ÷ 150.00 = 0.0066667 USD per JPY, which rounds to 0.0067.
    • This omits the GBP conversion: the result is USD per JPY, not the requested GBP per JPY.
  2. Q5.2

    Based only on the ex ante real interest rates in Exhibit 2, unhedged capital is most likely to flow from:

    1. AJapan to the euro area
    2. BUnited States to Japan
    3. CJapan to the United States
    Show answer and rationale

    Answer: C. Japan to the United States

    Rationale

    Japan to the United States

    • Exhibit 2 gives ex ante real rates of −0.5% in Japan (0.5% − 1.0%) and 2.0% in the United States (4.5% − 2.5%).
    • With equal default risk and liquidity and unchanged currency risk premiums, the largest real-rate differential suggests unhedged capital flows from Japan to the United States.

    Japan to the euro area

    • The euro area’s ex ante real rate is 0.5% (2.0% − 1.5%), above Japan’s −0.5%, so this direction does offer a real-rate incentive.
    • It is not the most likely flow among the choices because the United States offers Japan-based capital a larger real-rate differential: 2.5 percentage points rather than 1.0.

    United States to Japan

    • This reverses the real-rate incentive: Exhibit 2 puts the United States at 2.0% and Japan at −0.5%.
    • Under Cho’s stated assumptions, the differential instead suggests capital flowing toward the United States, not away from it.
  3. Q5.3

    Under the licensing arrangement in Exhibit 3, the quota rents will most likely accrue to:

    1. AThe US government
    2. BSelected US importing firms
    3. CSolandian steel producers
    Show answer and rationale

    Answer: B. Selected US importing firms

    Rationale

    Selected US importing firms

    • Exhibit 3 grants free import licences to selected US importing firms, giving them the right to import steel under the binding quota.
    • Those firms can capture the quota rent: the difference between the higher US price under the quota and the price they pay for imported steel.

    The US government

    • The government does not receive the rent because Exhibit 3 says it grants the licences without charge.
    • A tariff or an auction of licences could raise government revenue, but neither is part of this arrangement.

    Solandian steel producers

    • Exhibit 3 assigns the licences to US importing firms, not Solandian producers.
    • The stated small-exporting-country assumption provides no basis for Solandian producers to capture the rent by raising their selling price.
  4. Q5.4

    The binding steel quota in Exhibit 3 will most likely produce:

    1. AAn increase in consumer surplus
    2. BA reduction in domestic producer surplus
    3. CA net national welfare loss
    Show answer and rationale

    Answer: C. A net national welfare loss

    Rationale

    A net national welfare loss

    • The binding quota in Exhibit 3 reduces steel imports, raising the US price and creating production and consumption deadweight losses.
    • Free licences give selected US importers the quota rents, but those transfers do not offset the deadweight losses, and the case assumes no offsetting terms-of-trade gain.

    An increase in consumer surplus

    • The higher US steel price makes consumers pay more and buy less, so consumer surplus falls.
    • The free import licences benefit selected US importing firms, not steel consumers.

    A reduction in domestic producer surplus

    • The higher steel price encourages US producers to expand output, so domestic producer surplus rises.
    • That gain to protected producers does not eliminate the quota’s deadweight losses.
  5. Q5.5Fill in the blank

    Using Exhibit 2 and the approximate Fisher relation, the ex ante real interest rate for the United States is closest to:

    Answer:  

    Show answer and rationale

    Answer: 2.0%

    Rationale

    2.0%

    • Under the approximate Fisher relation, the ex ante real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus expected inflation.
    • For the United States, Exhibit 2 gives 4.5% − 2.5% = 2.0%.

    Common wrong answers

    7.0%

    • Adding expected inflation to the nominal rate instead of subtracting it gives 4.5% + 2.5% = 7.0%.

    -2.0%

    • Reversing the subtraction gives 2.5% − 4.5% = −2.0%.
  6. Q5.6Select all that apply

    Which of the following statements about the binding steel quota described in Exhibit 3 are most likely correct? (Select all that apply.)

    1. ADomestic producer surplus increases
    2. BConsumer surplus increases
    3. CThe US government collects revenue equal to the quota rents
    4. DThe quota creates a deadweight loss for the United States
    Show answer and rationale

    Answer: A. Domestic producer surplus increases; D. The quota creates a deadweight loss for the United States

    Rationale

    Select

    Domestic producer surplus increases

    • The binding quota reduces steel imports and raises the US price above the world price, benefiting protected domestic producers.
    • With upward-sloping supply, US producers expand output at the higher price, increasing producer surplus.

    The quota creates a deadweight loss for the United States

    • The higher US price causes domestic producers to make steel that cost less to import and consumers to forgo purchases they otherwise would have made.
    • These production and consumption losses reduce US welfare even though, under Exhibit 3, US importing firms receive the quota rents.

    Do not select

    Consumer surplus increases

    • The binding quota raises the price paid by US steel consumers and reduces the quantity they purchase.
    • Both effects decrease consumer surplus, rather than increase it.

    The US government collects revenue equal to the quota rents

    • Exhibit 3 grants import licences without charge to selected US importing firms, so those firms receive the quota rents.
    • Unlike a tariff, this licence allocation gives the US government no revenue from the restriction.
Show case rationale

Rationale

Currency units determine the cross-rate, while real interest-rate differentials suggest the direction of capital flows.

  • Exhibit 1 gives 192 JPY per GBP (150.00 × 1.2800), so the requested GBP per JPY is 1 ÷ 192 = 0.0052.
  • Using Exhibit 2 and the approximate Fisher relation, real rates are 2.0% in the United States (4.5% − 2.5%), 0.5% in the euro area, and −0.5% in Japan, suggesting unhedged flows from Japan to the United States under Cho’s assumptions.

A binding quota benefits protected producers but creates a US national welfare loss under the stated assumptions.

  • Higher domestic steel prices increase producer surplus and reduce consumer surplus; with no offsetting terms-of-trade improvement, the quota creates a deadweight loss.
  • Because Exhibit 3 grants licences free to selected US importing firms, those firms receive the quota rents, not the US government or Solandian producers.

Traps in this case

Multiplying exchange-rate figures without checking units

  • The requested GBP per JPY is the reciprocal of JPY per GBP, not the product 150.00 × 1.2800.

Treating nominal rates as real-return incentives

  • Exhibit 2’s inflation adjustments leave Japan below both other economies and the United States highest, rather than supporting a flow from the United States to Japan.

Equating a quota with a tariff

  • A tariff can raise government revenue, but Exhibit 3’s freely granted import licences direct quota rents to the selected firms.

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