Question 1

Accepted Answer

***Exhibit 1 may show disputed feasibility, but not prior negligence.***
- Harbor replaced the anchors **after** Lee’s injury, so Authority 1 bars using the replacement to prove Harbor was negligent before the accident.
- Lee’s expert disputed whether reinforcement was practical, allowing Harbor to offer Exhibit 1 for **feasibility**; Harbor should request a limiting instruction and avoid arguing that the replacement proves prior negligence.

***The remaining evidence depends on its proposed use and evidentiary foundation.***
- Exhibit 2’s **$75,000 compromise offer** and medical-expense proposal cannot prove liability, and its express denial of liability is no concession of fault.
- Exhibit 3’s seal and certification support authentication, while the inspector’s authorized observations qualify as a public record; the incident report’s observations may be substantive evidence, Lee’s alleged statement may be used against Lee, and the report’s existence may show Harbor’s documentation practice without proving its contents.

**Traps in this case**

*Treating a permitted use of Exhibit 1 as permission to argue negligence*
- Authority 2 calls for an instruction restricting evidence to its proper purpose upon timely request.

*Treating the medical-expense sentence as an admission*
- Authority 1 excludes the payment proposal as proof of liability, and the surrounding sentence expressly says **Harbor disputes liability**.

*Treating Exhibit 3 as conclusive notice of the accident-site anchor*
- The report identifies loose anchors in **Training Room B**, which Harbor’s supervisor says was another room, so that dispute affects what the report proves.

Question 2

Accepted Answer

***The physical evidence supports competing accounts, but the obscured video does not establish who started the fight.***
- Under Authority 1, Patel can authenticate the unedited Venue Camera 4 file through knowledge of the camera, date, time, and copying process; Patel need not have witnessed the fight.
- The Security Log’s broken bottle and the video of Morgan moving toward Rivera support **self-defense**, while Rivera’s possession of the flashlight supports the prosecution’s account.

***Morgan’s medical statement and fraud conviction serve different evidentiary purposes.***
- Under Authority 1, Morgan’s description of being hit with a flashlight is admissible as a **reasonably pertinent** statement made for medical diagnosis or treatment, as the Medical Note explains.
- Morgan’s eight-year-old felony tax-fraud conviction impeaches **truthfulness**, not conduct during the fight; attacking his truthful character permits the prosecution to offer appropriate truthful-character evidence afterward.

**Traps in this case**

*Treating the video as conclusive*
- Several seconds are blocked, so Morgan’s movement toward Rivera supports an inference but does not prove Morgan initiated the fight.

*Using fraud as proof of assault*
- A conviction requiring deceit bears on Morgan’s credibility, not whether he advanced with the bottle or committed an assault.

*Offering truthful-character testimony before an attack*
- Authority 1 allows the supervisor’s testimony supporting Morgan’s truthful character **only after** that character has been attacked.

Question 3

Accepted Answer

***Brooks’s statements turn on when she spoke and whether Cole can cross-examine her.***
- In Exhibit 1, Brooks described the fleeing robber and his tattoo while watching him, making her 911 description a **present-sense impression**.
- Because Brooks testifies and remains subject to cross-examination, her photographic identification in Exhibit 2 may be admitted **substantively** despite her uncertainty at trial.

***The remaining evidence requires a separate rule for each source.***
- Exhibit 4 predates Brooks’s contact with police, so her tattoo description supports admission as a **prior consistent statement** to rebut the claimed police-induced motive.
- Ortiz’s death makes him unavailable, and Cole’s earlier cross-examination about the car gave him an **opportunity and similar motive** to develop Ortiz’s former testimony.

**Traps in this case**

*Admitting Grant’s entire report as a public record*
- The prosecution cannot use the public-records exception for Grant’s law-enforcement observations against Cole, and Brooks’s account within Exhibit 3 presents an additional hearsay layer.

*Treating Price’s conviction as an ordinary felony*
- Submitting **fabricated invoices** required a dishonest act or false statement, so Cole may use Price’s three-year-old conviction to impeach him.

*Treating Exhibit 4 as an identification of Cole*
- Brooks’s text describes a **red bird tattoo**, not Cole by name; its significance is that she gave that description before the alleged police influence.

Question 4

Accepted Answer

***The legal-advice exchange was initially privileged, but the CEO’s forward created a waiver risk.***
- Exhibit 1 shows the CEO requested **legal advice** about revenue recognition and counsel requested records to analyze the contracts.
- Forwarding the entire exchange to a spouse seeking **personal reassurance** generally waived confidentiality as to the disclosed communication because the spouse was not assisting counsel.

***The disputed fraud claim governs how the mediation communications may be used.***
- Under Authority 1, neither the $175,000 offer nor the CEO’s mediation statement may be used to prove the claim’s value or the CEO’s knowledge.
- The CEO’s statement, although a **party statement** rather than hearsay, is generally barred for prior-inconsistent-statement impeachment; a demand offered to show negotiating bias in unrelated testimony may serve a legitimate other purpose.

**Traps in this case**

*Treating the CEO’s account of a hypothetical statement as resolving its meaning*
- Exhibit 3 conflicts with the quoted statement in Exhibit 2, so counsel should investigate the underlying approvals rather than assume either account is established.

*Assuming the mediation statement can come in because it is not hearsay*
- Authority 1 makes the **compromise rule** a separate obstacle to using the statement to prove knowledge or impeach the CEO’s denial.

*Failing to preserve the evidence needed to assess privilege and the accounting*
- Counsel should preserve the original email and **metadata**, identify recipients of the forward, and secure the sales records and contracts requested in Exhibit 1.

Question 5

Accepted Answer

***Solara’s privilege claims turn on the purpose and confidentiality of each communication, not merely on who sent it.***
- The Evans-Ortiz email seeks **legal advice**, and Bell’s participation does not defeat privilege because she was asked to supply information Ortiz needed; Bell’s memorandum likewise requires examining its legal-advice purpose and confidentiality, not its template or whether the supervisor’s account is disputed.
- Privilege can protect Ortiz’s questions summarized in the memorandum, but not the **underlying fact** of how many reviews Chen missed; voluntarily forwarding the email to an unnecessary friend generally waives privilege.

***The evidentiary exclusions depend on what was said, when, and why Chen offers it.***
- Offered to challenge Solara’s stated reason for termination, both the **$40,000 proposal** and the correction from five missed reviews to three are excluded as statements in compromise negotiations about the disputed claim.
- Evans’s **pre-dispute** offer to reimburse Chen’s emergency-room bill is excluded to prove liability, but “I should not have shouted at you” is not excluded merely because it accompanied that offer.

**Traps in this case**

*Assuming privilege follows from Ortiz’s title or requires Evans to anticipate a federal lawsuit*
- Exhibit 3 instead requires a **confidential legal-advice communication**, which Exhibit 1 supports without either assumption.

*Treating every statement accompanying an excluded offer alike*
- The correction in Exhibit 2 was made during **compromise negotiations**, whereas the medical-expense rule does not itself exclude Evans’s accompanying statement.

*Assuming inadvertent production automatically waives privilege*
- Counsel should document the production and review precautions, promptly notify Chen’s lawyer and request return or sequestration, then improve the process; Exhibit 3 also requires **reasonable precautions** and prompt corrective steps to avoid waiver.

Question 6

Accepted Answer

***Admissibility turns on reliable expert methods and the purpose for which the later mirror installation is offered.***
- Exhibit 1’s engineer relied on general training without blind-spot testing, industry standards, or an inspection, so the opinion lacks the **reliable basis** required by Exhibit 5.
- Under Exhibit 5, the later installation cannot prove negligence, but Exhibit 2’s memorandum and the installation may address **feasibility** after the driver claimed in Exhibit 3 that a second mirror could not be installed safely.

***Privilege protects the request for legal advice, not the underlying phone use.***
- The driver’s private email seeking counsel’s guidance in Exhibit 4 is privileged, and forwarding it to a consultant retained to assist trial preparation ordinarily **does not waive** that protection if the consultant facilitated representation.
- The historical fact that the driver glanced at his phone remains discoverable; counsel’s reply does not permit the driver to **deny that conduct falsely** under oath.

**Traps in this case**

*Treating an engineering degree as enough*
- Exhibit 5 requires sufficient facts and reliable methods applied to this truck, not merely the engineer’s general credentials.

*Using the new mirrors as direct proof of negligence*
- Exhibit 5 bars that use even though the driver’s feasibility testimony may support a limited alternative use and a limiting instruction.

*Treating the email as protection for the phone use itself*
- Privilege protects the confidential communication in Exhibit 4, not independently discoverable facts about what happened before the lane change.

Question 7

Accepted Answer

***Chen’s statements have different uses depending on whether they were sworn and when they were made.***
- Under Authority 1, Chen’s **unsworn denial** may impeach her but ordinarily is not substantive proof; the jury should receive a limiting instruction to that effect.
- Her **sworn deposition** may be used substantively and for impeachment if inconsistent with her trial testimony, while her conviction for falsifying records may impeach her character for truthfulness.

***Authentication and bias turn on evidence the parties can present, not guarantees of certainty.***
- Chen’s familiarity with Price’s number, writing style, and audit references, together with her personal export of Exhibit 3, provides sufficient evidence to **authenticate** the messages.
- Under Authority 1, Price may question Chen about Exhibit 2’s possible sentencing benefit and, after giving her an opportunity to address it, use the agreement to establish **bias**.

**Traps in this case**

*Demanding forensic or subscriber-record proof*
- Authentication does not require either form of proof when Chen’s testimony sufficiently connects Price to the Exhibit 3 conversation.

*Treating a signed denial as substantive evidence*
- Chen’s signature does not make her **unsworn** investigator statement substantive proof that Price never discussed the files.

*Using any consistent accusation to answer the fabrication charge*
- To rebut the claim that the cooperation agreement prompted Chen’s accusation, a consistent statement must predate the **alleged motive**, such as one made before negotiations began.

Question 8

Accepted Answer

***Harbor must distinguish evidence of Cruz’s knowledge from evidence offered for the truth of a statement.***
- Bell’s Exhibit 1 email can show **notice** of the absence of a six-percent cap if Harbor establishes that Cruz received it; Bell’s availability does not control that use.
- Wu may testify to Cruz’s admission in Exhibit 2 as a **party-opponent statement**, but the investigator’s unsigned, unadopted note does not independently prove that Wu heard it.

***Privilege, impeachment, and rehabilitation each depend on how the evidence is used.***
- Counsel’s confidential Exhibit 3 interview can remain privileged despite the compliance officer’s necessary participation, but forwarding the notes to an unnecessary **public-relations consultant** generally waives privilege.
- Exhibit 4 can contradict Cruz’s denial of prior adjustable-rate loan experience; Harbor should question her, authenticate the application if disputed, and request a **limiting instruction** if it is admitted only for impeachment.

**Traps in this case**

*Treating Exhibit 1 as Harbor’s party-opponent statement*
- A party-opponent statement is offered **against** that party, whereas Harbor offers Bell’s email to show its effect on Cruz.

*Treating Exhibit 4 as conclusive proof of Cruz’s understanding*
- The certified earlier application supports contradiction of her experience denial, not proof that she understood **every term** of Harbor’s later loan.

*Bolstering Bell before his truthfulness is attacked*
- Bell’s importance to the dispute alone does not permit Harbor to introduce his **reputation for truthfulness** before an attack on that trait.

Question 9

Accepted Answer

***Lee’s legal-advice exchange was initially privileged, but forwarding Shah’s response to the accountant ordinarily waived protection for that response.***
- Lee privately sought Shah’s legal advice about reimbursement in Exhibit 1, making their exchange **initially privileged**.
- Lee then voluntarily forwarded Shah’s response to an accountant who was not needed to provide legal services, ordinarily **waiving privilege** for the disclosed response.

***Bell’s grand-jury testimony and dishonesty conviction support different forms of impeachment.***
- Exhibit 3 contradicts Bell’s expected trial account and was given **under oath in a proceeding**, so the defense may use it both to impeach Bell and substantively.
- Bell’s conviction attacks **character for truthfulness** because falsifying loan documents required proof of dishonesty; obtaining proof of that element establishes the impeachment foundation.

**Traps in this case**

*Treating the conviction and grand-jury testimony as interchangeable*
- The conviction concerns Bell’s truthfulness generally, while Exhibit 3 directly contradicts Bell’s expected testimony about Lee’s instructions.

*Supporting Bell’s truthful reputation before it is attacked*
- Under Exhibit 4, the supervisor’s reputation testimony becomes admissible only **after** an attack on Bell’s character for truthfulness, such as use of the conviction.

*Assuming any earlier board report rebuts fabrication*
- The board report rebuts a claim that Bell fabricated the accusation for favorable treatment only if it **predated the promise**, so the defense must confirm and compare those dates.

Hearsay and its admissibility — MCQs

Hearsay and its admissibility — MCQs

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