General principles of criminal liability

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Proof Before Doctrine: The Fast Floor for Criminal Responsibility

General principles of criminal liability on the NextGen UBE asks five questions: who must prove what, what conduct can support liability, what mental state the statute requires, how mistakes and partial excuses affect that mental state, and when defensive force is justified. A neighboring doctrine readers often fold into this group is attempt or liability based on another person’s conduct; those are different questions.

NCBE marks this topic NOT STARRED. That means legal resources may be supplied when it is tested. If it is tested without resources, you need only demonstrate recognition that the topic is at issue. You are not required to hold this topic cold because resources may be supplied. Your floor is fast recognition and accurate use of the text in front of you.

Governing law: Elements of crimes and defences are tested on the basis of provided statutes. Constitutional questions are answered under the US Constitution only.

The vocabulary to recognize quickly is actus reus, voluntary act, omission, causation, possession, purpose, knowledge, recklessness, negligence, strict liability, mistake of fact, mistake of law, provocation, intoxication, self-defense, defense of others, and imperfect self-defense. Hold the sequence of questions and the function of each doctrine. Do not try to hold exact element wording, exception lists, or numbered subsections; those are the supplied-authority work.

Run a fact pattern in this order:

  1. Locate the supplied offense and defense provisions, then separate prosecution elements from affirmative defenses.
  2. Allocate the burden of production and persuasion before testing any element or defense.
  3. Identify the voluntary act, qualifying omission, result causation, or possession.
  4. Match each material statutory element to its required mental state.
  5. Test mistake, provocation, or intoxication against that mental state.
  6. Test self-defense or defense of others, including imminence, proportionality, retreat, and any imperfect-defense consequence.
  7. State who had to prove the disputed proposition and whether that burden was met.

The exact wording of each statute belongs in the resource. This order, the doctrinal names, and the questions each doctrine asks belong in your working floor.

The prosecution must prove every fact necessary to constitute the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. That includes each act, circumstance, result, and mental state required by the statute. The presumption of innocence means the defendant begins without a persuasion burden on those elements.

An affirmative defense is different. A statute may place production and persuasion on the defendant for a defense that does not negate an element. The usual persuasion standard is preponderance unless the supplied statute provides another standard. But if the defense would negate an element, the prosecution must still prove that element beyond a reasonable doubt; the legislature cannot simply relabel an element as a defense to shift that burden.

Distinguish a permissive inference from a mandatory presumption. A permissive inference allows, but does not require, the factfinder to infer one fact from another when the inference is rational. The prosecution retains the ultimate burden. A mandatory presumption directs the factfinder to find an element from a basic fact and is constitutionally defective if it relieves the prosecution of proving that element beyond a reasonable doubt.

Conduct, Omissions, and Possession: Finding the Actus Reus

Start with conduct, not blameworthiness. Criminal liability ordinarily requires a voluntary act. A reflex, convulsion, bodily movement during unconsciousness, or movement physically compelled by another person is not voluntary conduct. The relevant question is whether the defendant voluntarily performed the movement that the statute makes significant, not whether the defendant voluntarily entered the situation.

An omission can supply the actus reus only when the defendant had a legally recognized duty to act. Common sources are a statute, a qualifying relationship, a contract, voluntary assumption of care, or creation of the peril. The defendant must also have been physically capable of acting. Mere moral responsibility or the fact that a defendant happened to be present is not enough. Use the supplied statute for any additional duty or exception.

Causation matters when the statute requires a result. Ask whether the defendant’s conduct was an actual cause of the result and whether the result was sufficiently connected to count as a legal or proximate consequence. A later event does not automatically break causation. The supplied provision controls how it treats intervening conduct, extraordinary events, medical treatment, or the victim’s response.

Status alone is not conduct. A statute cannot constitutionally impose criminal punishment merely because a person has a condition or status rather than because the person performed an act or qualifying omission. Look for the conduct or circumstance the statute actually requires.

Possession is conduct when the defendant knowingly exercises control over an item or knowingly has it within immediate control. Actual possession involves physical possession. Constructive possession involves dominion or control without physical holding. Mere proximity, fleeting contact, or presence where an item is found may be evidence but does not itself establish knowing control. If possession is shared, ask whether the defendant knew of the item and had control over it, rather than treating another person’s possession as automatically attributable.

The actus-reus conclusion should be specific: identify the movement, omission, result-producing conduct, or knowing control, and explain why it was voluntary or legally sufficient.

Culpability in the Statute: Matching Mind to Element

Read a supplied statute for the operative verbs and mental-state modifiers. Separate the conduct element from surrounding circumstances and any required result. Then ask which mental state modifies each one. A modifier may apply to several following elements, but do not assume that it applies to every element when the text or structure indicates otherwise.

Mental stateActor’s required attitudeTypical statutory languageWhat the factfinder asks
PurposeThe actor’s conscious object is the conduct or resultintentionally, with the purpose of, intendsWas this result or conduct what the actor sought?
KnowledgeThe actor is aware of the conduct or circumstance and may know the result is practically certainknowingly, aware, conscious thatDid the actor know the relevant fact or practical certainty?
RecklessnessThe actor consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable riskrecklessly, conscious disregard, aware of riskDid the actor perceive the risk and disregard it?
NegligenceThe actor should have perceived a substantial and unjustifiable risknegligently, should have known, failed to perceiveWould a reasonable person in the actor’s situation have recognized it?
Strict liabilityNo mental state is required for the specified elementregardless of intent, absolute liability, no mental state stated where text makes liability clearHas the prosecution proved the act and circumstance even without culpable awareness?

Purpose is more than knowledge. Knowledge is more than awareness that conduct is risky. Recklessness requires actual awareness of the risk; negligence is judged by what the actor should have perceived. Strict liability is limited to the element the statute makes strict and does not erase the prosecution’s burden on other elements.

Do not import a mental state from general criminal-law memory when the statute supplies one. Circle each mental-state word, draw it to the element it modifies, and identify whether the provision contains a default rule or an exception. “Knowingly possessing” differs from “knowingly causing,” and “recklessly creating a circumstance” differs from “recklessly causing a result.”

Proof is usually circumstantial. A statement, preparation, concealment, timing, or obviousness of a risk may support an inference, but an inference is not automatically a conclusive finding. The prosecution still must prove the required state beyond a reasonable doubt unless the statute makes the relevant element strict.

Mistake as a Defense: Facts, Law, and the Mental-State Switch

A mistake of fact concerns what happened in the world: the object, circumstance, identity, condition, or result. A mistake of law concerns what the law permits, prohibits, or requires. Begin by classifying the mistake, then ask which statutory element the mistake affects.

A factual mistake can defeat liability when it prevents the mental state required for an element. An honest mistake may defeat purpose or knowledge. For recklessness, ask whether the defendant actually recognized and consciously disregarded the risk despite the mistake. For negligence, ask whether the defendant should have recognized the risk. Thus, an unreasonable factual mistake may still support negligence even when it defeats knowledge.

Reasonableness matters only when the statute makes it relevant or when the defense itself uses an objective standard. Do not turn every mistake rule into a reasonable-mistake test. A strict-liability element is not defeated merely because the defendant was honestly mistaken.

Mistake of law ordinarily does not excuse conduct merely because the defendant misunderstood the law. A supplied statute may nevertheless make legal knowledge an element, recognize reasonable reliance on an official statement, or create another express exception. “I did not know this was prohibited” and “I did not know this person or object had the legally relevant status” may produce different results under the text.

Use this decision tree when a mistake is claimed:

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A mistake may also affect an affirmative defense directly. For example, a factual mistake about an apparent threat may be relevant to whether the actor reasonably believed defensive force was necessary. That question is governed by the defense provision, not automatically by the general mistake provision.

Heat, Chemicals, and Capacity: Partial Excuses Without a Blank Check

Provocation is generally not a complete defense. It may mitigate culpability when the supplied statute recognizes sudden passion, heat of passion, adequate provocation, or a similar partial excuse. Check four facts: the triggering event, the defendant’s actual emotional state, the causal connection between event and conduct, and whether enough time passed for cooling off. If the statute includes an objective component, ask whether the provocation would have affected a reasonable person in the specified circumstances.

Provocation does not itself establish justification. The actor may have been angry and still have acted unlawfully. It matters only to the extent the supplied provision gives the emotional state a legal consequence.

Voluntary intoxication is ordinarily not a general excuse. Under a supplied statute, it may be considered in deciding whether the defendant formed purpose or knowledge, but it generally does not erase recklessness or negligence merely because the defendant became impaired. The statute may expressly adopt a different treatment, so locate its words before drawing the conclusion.

Involuntary intoxication can matter differently because the defendant did not voluntarily create the impairment. Ask whether the provision recognizes it and whether the condition prevented the required act or mental state. Evidence that the defendant was confused, intoxicated, or emotionally overwhelmed is not itself a defense; it must connect to a statutory mental state or a stated mitigating rule.

Defensive Force: Necessity, Proportion, and the Honest Mistake

Self-defense asks whether the actor used force reasonably believed necessary to protect against another person’s imminent unlawful force. Separate the subjective and objective inquiries when the statute requires both: did the actor actually believe force was necessary, and was that belief reasonable under the circumstances?

Then test the following sequence:

  1. Threat: Was the other person using or threatening unlawful force?
  2. Imminence: Was the threatened force immediate rather than future, speculative, or avoidable by waiting?
  3. Necessity: Was force reasonably believed necessary at that moment?
  4. Proportionality: Was the force used proportionate to the threatened force? Deadly force ordinarily requires a reasonable belief of imminent deadly force or similarly grave harm when the statute says so.
  5. Retreat: Does the supplied statute require retreat before force, and does it provide exceptions for the home, workplace, or other stated locations?
  6. Actor’s role: Did the defendant initiate the confrontation, and if so, did the defendant withdraw or communicate withdrawal when the statute requires it?
  7. Imperfect defense: If the belief was honest but unreasonable, does the supplied statute reduce culpability rather than provide a complete defense?

A mistake about the attacker’s weapon, identity, or intention is not automatically fatal. If the defense turns on reasonable belief, the mistake may still support the defense when the surrounding facts made the belief reasonable. An unreasonable but honest belief may be an imperfect self-defense only if the supplied statute gives it that consequence.

Defense of others uses the same core questions. The actor must generally reasonably believe that the person defended faces imminent unlawful force and that the chosen response is necessary and proportionate. Do not treat the defender’s good intentions as enough; the statutory belief and force requirements still control.

The burden comes next. If self-defense is an affirmative defense that does not negate an offense element, the supplied statute may place production and persuasion on the defendant by preponderance. If the defense negates an element, the prosecution retains the burden to prove that element beyond a reasonable doubt. Read the allocation provision rather than assuming one universal rule.

For the following item, the supplied provision reads:

The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of an offense.

A defendant asserting self-defense must prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Self-defense is an affirmative defense and does not negate an element of an offense.

A person may use force if the person reasonably believes that force is immediately necessary to protect against another person’s unlawful force.

A person may use deadly force only if the person reasonably believes that another person is using or is about to use deadly force.

A mistake of fact is a defense only if it negates a mental state required by the offense. A mistake of law is no defense unless this statute expressly provides otherwise.

Voluntary intoxication is not a defense, but it may be considered in deciding whether the actor formed a purpose or knowledge required by the offense.

At night in a parking garage, D voluntarily became intoxicated but remained able to walk, speak, and aim accurately. R approached D rapidly while holding a shiny metal screwdriver. R shouted, “Give me your wallet or I will stab you,” and stood six feet away. D believed the screwdriver was a knife and fired one shot at R. The screwdriver was actually not a knife, but a reasonable person observing the encounter would have believed it was a knife. D stopped shooting when R dropped the screwdriver and ran away.

Practice

Select the two statements most accurately applying the supplied provision.

(A) D’s factual mistake defeats self-defense because the object was not actually a knife.(B) D’s factual mistake does not defeat self-defense because the surrounding facts made his belief in imminent deadly force reasonable.(C) D’s voluntary intoxication automatically bars self-defense.(D) D bears the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence.(E) The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that D was sober before self-defense can be considered.(F) D’s mistake is a mistake of law because he believed the shooting was legally justified.
Your answers

A quick contrast: A caretaker voluntarily agrees to watch a child, leaves the child alone beside an unfenced pool, and cannot return before the child is injured.

The omission may supply conduct because voluntary assumption of care can create a legal duty, but the statute must still support causation and the required mental state.

High-Yield Points - ⚡ Biggest Takeaways

The prosecution proves every offense element beyond a reasonable doubt. An affirmative defense may carry a defendant’s persuasion burden unless it negates an offense element. A factual mistake defeats liability only when it defeats the mental state the statute requires. Self-defense requires reasonable belief, imminent unlawful force, necessary force, and proportionality. Voluntary intoxication is usually limited to statutory purpose or knowledge questions.

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Practice Questions: General principles of criminal liability

  1. 1.

    • 2. Using only the supplied file and legal resources, draft a persuasive argument section supporting dismissal of the aggravated-assault charge. Explain the relationship between the first and second offenses, address the government's separate-sovereigns and mistrial arguments, and state the appropriate requested relief.

      • 3.

        • 4.

          • 5.

            • 6. Police arrested a warehouse employee for a completed theft and brought her to a station interview room. Before any criminal charge or court appearance, officers gave complete Miranda warnings, and the employee stated that she understood them. She then said, "I might need a lawyer if this gets serious." An officer replied, "The decision is yours," and asked whether she had taken the missing equipment. She confessed. No threats or promises were made, and the interview lasted 20 minutes. Defense counsel moves to suppress the confession under both Miranda and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Is the court likely to grant the motion?

              • A. Yes, because any reference to a lawyer requires officers to stop questioning a suspect who has received Miranda warnings.
              • B. Yes, because the arrest automatically attached the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for the theft investigation.
              • C. No, because the statement was voluntary and a waiver may be implied without a signed writing.
              • D. No, because the employee made no unambiguous request for counsel and adversarial judicial proceedings had not begun.
              Show answer

              Answer: D. No, because the employee made no unambiguous request for counsel and adversarial judicial proceedings had not begun.

              No, because the employee made no unambiguous request for counsel and adversarial judicial proceedings had not begun. - “I might need a lawyer if this gets serious” was not an unambiguous request for counsel, so Miranda did not require officers to stop questioning. - The Sixth Amendment right had not attached because the employee had not been charged or brought before a court. Yes, because any reference to a lawyer requires officers to stop questioning a suspect who has received Miranda warnings. - Miranda requires officers to stop questioning after an unambiguous request for counsel, not every reference to a lawyer. - The employee’s conditional statement did not clearly ask for counsel before the officer asked about the equipment. Yes, because the arrest automatically attached the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for the theft investigation. - Arrest alone does not attach the Sixth Amendment right to counsel; adversarial judicial proceedings must begin. - The employee was questioned before any criminal charge or court appearance. No, because the statement was voluntary and a waiver may be implied without a signed writing. - A signed waiver is unnecessary, and answering after understanding the Miranda warnings can imply a waiver. - But voluntariness and implied waiver alone do not resolve whether the lawyer reference required questioning to stop or whether the Sixth Amendment right had attached.

            • 7. A warehouse employee learned that a coworker planned to set fire to a storage shed containing outdated inventory after closing in order to collect insurance proceeds. Wanting the arson to succeed, the employee texted the coworker the alarm code and explained that the security guard usually left at 10:15 p.m. The coworker replied, “Perfect. I’ll do it tonight.” Before the coworker entered the warehouse, the employee became frightened and texted, “Forget it. I’m out.” The employee did not notify the warehouse or otherwise try to prevent the arson. The coworker entered using the code and set fire to the shed. The prosecution has charged the employee as an accomplice to the completed arson. Under generally accepted principles of accomplice liability, which of the following is the strongest conclusion?

              • A. The employee is liable because the employee intentionally aided the arson and did not effectively withdraw before it occurred.
              • B. The employee is not liable because the employee was not physically present when the coworker set the fire.
              • C. The employee is not liable because the employee communicated withdrawal before the coworker entered the warehouse.
              • D. The employee is liable only for solicitation because accomplice liability requires participation during the commission of the arson.
              Show answer

              Answer: A. The employee is liable because the employee intentionally aided the arson and did not effectively withdraw before it occurred.

              The employee is liable because the employee intentionally aided the arson and did not effectively withdraw before it occurred. - The employee supplied the alarm code and guard’s departure time to help the coworker commit arson, and the coworker used the code to enter. - Having already provided assistance, the employee’s “Forget it. I’m out” text did not neutralize that aid or otherwise prevent its use. The employee is not liable because the employee was not physically present when the coworker set the fire. - Accomplice liability does not require physical presence when the crime occurs. - The employee intentionally helped beforehand by providing access information that the coworker used. The employee is not liable because the employee communicated withdrawal before the coworker entered the warehouse. - The timing of the text alone did not make the withdrawal effective after the employee had supplied the alarm code. - The employee neither neutralized the code nor warned the warehouse or otherwise tried to prevent the arson. The employee is liable only for solicitation because accomplice liability requires participation during the commission of the arson. - Precrime assistance can support accomplice liability for a completed offense. - The employee did more than encourage the coworker: the employee provided information that enabled entry and remained available for use despite the later text.

            • 8. A warehouse owner decided to burn the warehouse to collect insurance proceeds. The owner bought gasoline, drove to the warehouse at night, disabled the alarm, and poured gasoline across the wooden floor. The owner then removed a match from a pocket and approached the gasoline. Before striking the match, the owner reconsidered because an employee might be working in a rear office. The owner replaced the match, absorbed most of the gasoline with shop towels, and left. The gasoline caused discoloration but no burning or structural damage. The jurisdiction follows the substantial-step test for attempt and recognizes renunciation as a complete defense to attempt liability when the abandonment is voluntary and complete before the crime is accomplished. What is the strongest charge supported by these facts?

              • A. Solicitation, because purchasing the supplies encouraged the employee to participate in the planned burning.
              • B. No inchoate offense, because the owner voluntarily and completely renounced the criminal purpose before completing the arson.
              • C. Completed arson, because pouring gasoline caused sufficient damage to the warehouse floor.
              • D. Attempted arson, because the owner intended the burning and took a substantial step toward completing it.
              Show answer

              Answer: B. No inchoate offense, because the owner voluntarily and completely renounced the criminal purpose before completing the arson.

              No inchoate offense, because the owner voluntarily and completely renounced the criminal purpose before completing the arson. - Pouring gasoline and preparing a match were a substantial step toward the intended burning, but the jurisdiction makes voluntary and complete renunciation a defense to attempt. - The owner reconsidered because an employee might be present, put away the match, absorbed most of the gasoline, and left without starting a fire. Solicitation, because purchasing the supplies encouraged the employee to participate in the planned burning. - Solicitation requires asking or encouraging another person to commit a crime; buying gasoline did not involve the employee. - The employee’s possible presence prompted the owner to stop, not to recruit the employee. Completed arson, because pouring gasoline caused sufficient damage to the warehouse floor. - Arson requires burning, and the gasoline caused only discoloration, with no burning or structural damage. - Pouring gasoline brought the owner close to committing arson but did not complete it. Attempted arson, because the owner intended the burning and took a substantial step toward completing it. - The intent to burn and the gasoline poured across the wooden floor establish an attempt under the substantial-step test. - The charge nevertheless fails because the jurisdiction recognizes the owner’s voluntary and complete renunciation before the burning as a complete defense.

            • 9. A courier agreed to deliver a sealed package for a regular customer. The customer said that the package contained business records, and nothing about the package suggested otherwise. Police stopped the courier and discovered cocaine inside. The jurisdiction's statute provides: “A person commits an offense by knowingly possessing a package containing a controlled substance.” The prosecution concedes that the courier intentionally carried the package but cannot prove that the courier knew or suspected that it contained cocaine. The courier moves for a judgment of acquittal. Which of the following best states the applicable rule?

              • A. The prosecution must prove that the courier knew the package contained a controlled substance.
              • B. The prosecution need prove only that the courier intentionally possessed the package.
              • C. The courier is liable because ignorance of the package's contents is a mistake of law.
              • D. The courier is liable unless the package belonged to someone other than the courier.
              Show answer

              Answer: A. The prosecution must prove that the courier knew the package contained a controlled substance.

              The prosecution must prove that the courier knew the package contained a controlled substance. - Knowingly applies to the material circumstance that the package contained a controlled substance, not just to the act of carrying it. - Because the prosecution cannot prove the courier knew or suspected what was inside, intentional delivery of the package alone cannot sustain a conviction. The prosecution need prove only that the courier intentionally possessed the package. - Intentionally carrying the sealed package establishes possession but not knowledge of its contents. - The customer described business records, and nothing about the package suggested otherwise, so the conceded act of carrying it does not establish the required awareness. The courier is liable because ignorance of the package's contents is a mistake of law. - The courier's belief that the package held business records concerns a fact, not what the statute prohibits. - A mistake about that fact matters because the statute requires knowledge that the package contained a controlled substance. The courier is liable unless the package belonged to someone other than the courier. - Ownership is not an element of the stated offense; a person can possess a package belonging to someone else. - Whether the customer owned the package does not replace proof that the courier knew it contained a controlled substance.

            Flashcards: General principles of criminal liability

            1. 1. What are the usual elements the prosecution must prove for a crime?

              Show answer

              The prosecution generally must prove a voluntary act or qualifying omission, the required mental state, any required attendant circumstances, and causation if the offense is result-based. The prosecution must also prove concurrence between the act and mental state.

            2. 2. What is the majority rule for strict-liability offenses?

              Show answer

              Most crimes require a culpable mental state, but a legislature may create a strict-liability offense for which the prosecution need not prove mens rea as to a specified element. Courts generally construe criminal statutes narrowly and presume a mens rea requirement unless the statute clearly indicates strict liability.

            3. 3. Identify the standard of proof required for each governmental action: 1) A brief investigative stop, 2) An arrest or search warrant, 3) A criminal conviction.

              Show answer

              1) Reasonable suspicion, 2) Probable cause, 3) Beyond a reasonable doubt.

            4. 4. What is the core meaning of the presumption of innocence in a criminal trial, and what two burdens does it place on the prosecution?

              Show answer

              The presumption of innocence means the prosecution begins with the burden of proving guilt, and the defendant has no obligation to prove innocence. It places on the prosecution the burden of production (legally sufficient evidence) and the burden of persuasion (convincing the factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt).

            5. 5. Can voluntary intoxication negate the specific intent required for a crime?

              Show answer

              Where permitted by governing law, voluntary intoxication may be considered in deciding whether the defendant formed a required purpose or other specially required mental state. It typically does not excuse crimes based on recklessness or general intent.

            6. 6. Under a typical provocation statute, if a defendant cools down after an adequate provocation, can a later verbal insult rekindle the heat of passion?

              Show answer

              No. After a reasonable cooling period, the original provocation is spent. Rekindling requires a new act of legally adequate provocation, and mere words alone are typically insufficient to qualify as adequate provocation.

            7. 7. What is the primary distinction between voluntary and involuntary intoxication?

              Show answer

              Voluntary intoxication occurs when the defendant knowingly and willingly consumes the substance. Involuntary intoxication occurs when the defendant did not knowingly and freely introduce the intoxicant, such as a spiked drink, coercion, or an unforeseeable reaction to medication taken as directed.

            8. 8. What are the key stages in analyzing a provocation claim for voluntary manslaughter?

              Show answer

              The analysis involves assessing actual heat of passion, legally adequate provocation, whether a reasonable cooling time elapsed, and if a new adequate provocation rekindled the heat, all while ensuring causation.

            9. 9. Distinguish between a mistake of fact and a mistake of law in the context of criminal liability.

              Show answer

              A mistake of fact concerns circumstances in the world (e.g., ownership, age, identity). A mistake of law concerns the legal rule itself (e.g., what the statute prohibits, whether a permit is required). A belief about a legal status can still be factual if it concerns an underlying circumstance (e.g., believing a document is not a court order because it was never received).

            10. 10. Identify the protected interest and typical force limitation for self-defense, defense of others, and defense of property.

              Show answer

              Self-defense protects the person (bodily integrity) from imminent unlawful force: reasonably necessary nondeadly force is permitted, while deadly force is limited to preventing imminent death or serious bodily harm. Defense of others protects another person from imminent unlawful force and generally permits the level of force that person could lawfully use. Defense of property protects property against trespass, theft, or other interference; reasonable nondeadly force is ordinarily permitted, but deadly force is not justified merely to protect property.

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