Free MBE practice questions: the seven MBE subjects

The Multistate Bar Examination (MBE) is the multiple-choice part of the legacy UBE. Oncourse's bar questions are written for the NextGen UBE; this set shows its standalone multiple-choice questions in the seven subjects the MBE tests, each with its answer and explanation.

About the MBE

  • The MBE is a six-hour, 200-question multiple-choice exam in two three-hour sessions; 175 questions are scored and 25 are unscored pretest items. Source: NCBE: Preparing for the MBE
  • The 175 scored questions are split equally, 25 each, across Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Contracts, Criminal Law and Procedure, Evidence, Real Property and Torts. Source: NCBE: Preparing for the MBE
  • The legacy UBE, which includes the MBE, is given through February 2028; most jurisdictions move to the NextGen UBE between July 2026 and July 2028. Source: NCBE: NextGen bar exam

21 free MBE practice questions

Multiple-choice questions from 7 subjects of Oncourse's MBE question bank (377 questions in total, including other formats). Open “Show answer and rationale” under each one.

Civil ProcedureAll 39 Civil Procedure questions →

Q1

A citizen of State A sued a corporation incorporated and headquartered in State B in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, seeking $500,000 for injuries caused by an allegedly defective product. State A law permits compensatory damages but provides that punitive damages are unavailable in product-liability actions. No federal statute or Federal Rule addresses the availability of punitive damages. The plaintiff nevertheless requested punitive damages, arguing that federal courts traditionally exercise discretion over remedies and that allowing punitive damages would encourage careful manufacturing. The corporation moved to strike the punitive-damages request. Which of the following is the strongest argument supporting the corporation's motion?

  1. AThe state restriction governs because it defines the available remedy and disregarding it could produce materially different outcomes in state and federal court.
  2. BThe state restriction governs because federal courts must apply every state rule whenever jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship.
  3. CFederal law governs because the requested relief appears in a pleading, and pleading matters are necessarily procedural under federal law.
  4. DFederal law governs because a federal court may disregard state law when the court believes a different remedy would advance deterrence.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: A. The state restriction governs because it defines the available remedy and disregarding it could produce materially different outcomes in state and federal court.

Rationale

The state restriction governs because it defines the available remedy and disregarding it could produce materially different outcomes in state and federal court.

  • State A’s bar on punitive damages in product-liability actions limits the available remedy, and no federal statute or Federal Rule conflicts with it.
  • Allowing the plaintiff to seek punitive damages only in federal court could materially change the outcome and encourage forum shopping, contrary to Erie principles.

The state restriction governs because federal courts must apply every state rule whenever jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship.

  • Diversity jurisdiction does not require federal courts to apply every state rule; federal procedural law still governs procedural matters.
  • State A’s restriction applies because it limits damages in this product-liability action, not simply because the parties are citizens of different states.

Federal law governs because the requested relief appears in a pleading, and pleading matters are necessarily procedural under federal law.

  • Federal rules may govern how the plaintiff pleads a request for relief, but they do not create an entitlement to punitive damages.
  • The motion concerns whether State A permits punitive damages for this product-liability claim, not how the request appears in the complaint.

Federal law governs because a federal court may disregard state law when the court believes a different remedy would advance deterrence.

  • A federal court’s preference for stronger deterrence does not override State A’s substantive limit on damages.
  • Because no federal statute or Federal Rule addresses punitive-damages availability, the court cannot supply a different remedy merely as a policy choice.

Topic: Jurisdiction, venue and the Erie doctrine

Q2

A citizen of State A purchased an electric bicycle through a retailer's interactive website while at home in State A. The retailer is incorporated and has its principal place of business in State B. It has no property or employees in State A, but it ships hundreds of bicycles there annually, advertises free delivery to State A, and provides remote warranty service to State A customers. The bicycle's battery allegedly malfunctioned while the customer was riding near her home in State A, causing serious injuries. She sued the retailer in a federal district court in State A, seeking $180,000 under state products-liability law. The retailer timely moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Which of the following is the customer's strongest argument that the court may exercise personal jurisdiction?

  1. AThe court may exercise specific jurisdiction because the claim arises from the retailer's deliberate sales and support activities directed to the forum state.
  2. BThe court may exercise general jurisdiction because substantial recurring sales make the retailer at home in every state where it conducts business.
  3. CThe court lacks personal jurisdiction because the customer's injury occurred outside the forum state, even though the product was purchased and used there.
  4. DThe court lacks personal jurisdiction unless the retailer owns property or maintains employees in the forum state.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: A. The court may exercise specific jurisdiction because the claim arises from the retailer's deliberate sales and support activities directed to the forum state.

Rationale

The court may exercise specific jurisdiction because the claim arises from the retailer's deliberate sales and support activities directed to the forum state.

  • The retailer purposefully directed sales toward State A by advertising free delivery there, shipping hundreds of bicycles there annually, and serving its customers remotely.
  • This products-liability claim arises from a bicycle purchased in State A and an alleged battery malfunction that injured the customer there, connecting the suit to those forum-directed activities.

The court may exercise general jurisdiction because substantial recurring sales make the retailer at home in every state where it conducts business.

  • A corporation is ordinarily at home where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business—both in State B for this retailer.
  • Hundreds of annual sales to State A may support specific jurisdiction over a related claim, but they do not make the retailer at home in every state where it sells bicycles.

The court lacks personal jurisdiction because the customer's injury occurred outside the forum state, even though the product was purchased and used there.

  • The premise is incorrect: the battery allegedly malfunctioned while the customer was riding near her home in State A.
  • The in-state purchase and injury connect the claim to the retailer’s deliberate State A sales and support activities, supporting specific jurisdiction.

The court lacks personal jurisdiction unless the retailer owns property or maintains employees in the forum state.

  • Property or employees in State A are not prerequisites to specific jurisdiction.
  • The retailer’s targeted delivery offer, recurring shipments, and remote warranty service establish purposeful State A contacts despite its lack of a physical presence there.

Topic: Jurisdiction, venue and the Erie doctrine

Q3

A pedestrian sued a delivery company in federal court for negligence after one of the company's vans struck her in a crosswalk. After discovery, the company moved for summary judgment and submitted an affidavit from the driver stating that the traffic signal was green for the van. The pedestrian submitted deposition testimony from an eyewitness who stated that the signal was red and that the driver was looking at a phone. Both witnesses had a clear view of the intersection, and the governing negligence law is undisputed. The company argues that its driver gave a more detailed account and has a stronger memory than the eyewitness. Is the court likely to grant the motion?

  1. AYes, because a court may credit the more detailed testimony when both witnesses claim firsthand knowledge.
  2. BNo, because the conflicting firsthand accounts create a genuine dispute that a factfinder must resolve.
  3. CYes, because testimony from a party's employee is entitled to greater weight than testimony from an uninvolved observer.
  4. DNo, because summary judgment is unavailable whenever a negligence claim turns partly on witness testimony.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: B. No, because the conflicting firsthand accounts create a genuine dispute that a factfinder must resolve.

Rationale

No, because the conflicting firsthand accounts create a genuine dispute that a factfinder must resolve.

  • The driver said the signal was green, while the eyewitness said it was red and the driver was looking at a phone, creating a genuine dispute of material fact about negligence.
  • Because both witnesses had a clear view, the court cannot decide whose account is more credible on summary judgment.

Yes, because a court may credit the more detailed testimony when both witnesses claim firsthand knowledge.

  • The driver’s greater detail and asserted stronger memory do not let the court weigh competing testimony on summary judgment.
  • Those arguments belong to the factfinder, which must resolve the conflicting accounts.

Yes, because testimony from a party's employee is entitled to greater weight than testimony from an uninvolved observer.

  • The driver’s status as a company employee gives his affidavit no special weight over the eyewitness’s deposition testimony.
  • Both accounts concern what happened at the intersection, so the court cannot prefer one merely because of the witness’s relationship to the company.

No, because summary judgment is unavailable whenever a negligence claim turns partly on witness testimony.

  • Negligence claims can be resolved by summary judgment when the evidence presents no genuine dispute of material fact.
  • Denial is warranted here because the witnesses conflict about the signal and the driver’s conduct, not because the claim involves witness testimony.

Topic: Pretrial procedure and jury trial

Constitutional LawAll 53 Constitutional Law questions →

Q1

A city enacted an ordinance requiring a permit before anyone may distribute more than 500 leaflets in a city park during a single day. A neighborhood association opposes the ordinance but has not distributed leaflets in the park for three years. Its director states that the association might organize a leafleting event someday, although it has no proposed date, message, budget, or volunteers. The city has never investigated the association or threatened it with enforcement. The association nevertheless filed suit in federal court, seeking an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance. The city moved to dismiss, arguing that the association had not established an injury in fact. Is the court likely to grant the motion?

  1. AThe association lacks standing because the alleged future enforcement injury is not sufficiently imminent.
  2. BThe association has standing because litigation expenses constitute an injury caused by the ordinance.
  3. CThe association has standing because any organization may challenge a speech restriction before enforcement.
  4. DThe association lacks standing because only individual speakers may assert First Amendment rights.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: A. The association lacks standing because the alleged future enforcement injury is not sufficiently imminent.

Rationale

The association lacks standing because the alleged future enforcement injury is not sufficiently imminent.

  • An injunction requires an actual or sufficiently imminent injury, but the association has not leafleted in the park for three years and has no date, message, budget, or volunteers for a future event.
  • With no concrete plan to distribute more than 500 leaflets and no investigation or enforcement threat from the city, its alleged injury is too speculative.

The association has standing because litigation expenses constitute an injury caused by the ordinance.

  • The cost of filing this suit is a voluntary litigation expense, not an injury from the ordinance’s permit requirement.
  • Without a sufficiently imminent leafleting event or enforcement threat, the association cannot create standing by spending money to challenge the ordinance.

The association has standing because any organization may challenge a speech restriction before enforcement.

  • A pre-enforcement challenge still requires a credible intended course of conduct and a genuine threat that the restriction will be enforced against the plaintiff.
  • The director’s statement that the association might leaflet someday, without any plan or city threat, does not meet that requirement.

The association lacks standing because only individual speakers may assert First Amendment rights.

  • An organization may assert its own rights and, if the requirements are met, may also sue on behalf of its members.
  • The association’s organizational form is not the defect; its lack of a sufficiently imminent injury is.

Topic: Federal judicial power

Q2

A state court convicted a business owner of violating a state environmental statute and imposed a prison sentence and fine. After unsuccessfully completing the state appellate process, the owner petitioned the President for a pardon. The President issued a document stating that the owner was fully pardoned for the conviction and directing state officials to release the owner and refund the fine. The governor declined to comply, asserting that the President lacked authority over the conviction. The owner then filed an action in federal court seeking enforcement of the pardon. Which of the following best states the applicable constitutional rule?

  1. AThe pardon is effective because the President may pardon offenses arising under either federal or state law.
  2. BThe pardon is ineffective because the President's pardon power extends only to offenses against the United States.
  3. CThe pardon is effective because the state conviction became final before the President issued the pardon.
  4. DThe pardon is ineffective because executive pardons may excuse imprisonment but may not affect criminal fines.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: B. The pardon is ineffective because the President's pardon power extends only to offenses against the United States.

Rationale

The pardon is ineffective because the President's pardon power extends only to offenses against the United States.

  • Article II limits the President’s pardon power to offenses against the United States, meaning federal offenses.
  • The owner was convicted under a state statute, so the President’s document cannot require state officials to release the owner or refund the fine.

The pardon is effective because the President may pardon offenses arising under either federal or state law.

  • Presidential clemency does not extend to state convictions, even when the conduct concerns a matter of federal interest.
  • Relief from this state conviction would require authority under the state’s clemency system, not a presidential pardon.

The pardon is effective because the state conviction became final before the President issued the pardon.

  • Completing state appeals does not turn a state offense into an offense against the United States.
  • The obstacle is the President’s lack of authority over the conviction, not when the pardon was issued.

The pardon is ineffective because executive pardons may excuse imprisonment but may not affect criminal fines.

  • The pardon fails because it addresses a state conviction, not because the sentence includes a fine.
  • A valid federal pardon may affect criminal penalties beyond imprisonment; the distinction here is state versus federal authority.

Topic: Federal judicial power

Q3

Congress enacted a statute appropriating $800 million for replacement of unsafe drinking-water pipes. The statute directs that the Environmental Agency “shall distribute the appropriated funds according to the formula in this Act during the current fiscal year.” After signing the statute, the President issued a directive suspending half of the distributions. The directive explained that retaining the money would strengthen the nation's position in unrelated trade negotiations. The statute gives the President no authority to suspend or redirect the funds. A city that qualified for a formula grant did not receive its scheduled payment and sued the responsible executive officials for declaratory and injunctive relief. Which of the following is the city's strongest argument?

  1. AThe suspension is valid because the President controls the execution of all federal spending laws.
  2. BThe suspension is valid because foreign-relations concerns permit the President to revise domestic appropriations.
  3. CThe suspension is invalid only if Congress overrides the directive by a two-thirds vote.
  4. DThe suspension is invalid because the President may not disregard Congress's mandatory appropriation.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: D. The suspension is invalid because the President may not disregard Congress's mandatory appropriation.

Rationale

The suspension is invalid because the President may not disregard Congress's mandatory appropriation.

  • The Act says the Environmental Agency shall distribute the $800 million under its formula during the current fiscal year, and gives the President no authority to suspend payments.
  • Withholding the city's scheduled grant for unrelated trade negotiations conflicts with that command, so the city can seek declaratory and injunctive relief against the responsible officials.

The suspension is valid because the President controls the execution of all federal spending laws.

  • The President's duty to execute spending laws does not include authority to change this Act's mandatory distribution requirement.
  • Suspending half the distributions prevents, rather than carries out, the formula payments Congress directed.

The suspension is valid because foreign-relations concerns permit the President to revise domestic appropriations.

  • The directive cites unrelated trade negotiations, but that rationale does not authorize suspending payments required by this domestic spending statute.
  • Congress gave the President no discretion to retain the appropriated money for negotiating leverage.

The suspension is invalid only if Congress overrides the directive by a two-thirds vote.

  • The enacted statute already requires distribution; Congress need not override a directive that lacks authority to suspend it.
  • A two-thirds override concerns a presidential veto of legislation, not a directive issued after the President signed the Act.

Topic: Legislative and executive powers

ContractsAll 67 Contracts questions →

Q1

A restaurant hired a commercial-kitchen company to replace its kitchen system for $180,000. The written agreement allocated $105,000 to standard ovens, refrigerators, and ventilation equipment and $75,000 to design, installation, and employee training. The equipment could be purchased from other suppliers, but the restaurant selected the company because it promised to redesign the kitchen for faster service. After installation, the restaurant claimed that the ventilation equipment failed to conform to the agreement. The company argued that common-law substantial-performance principles governed the entire transaction, while the restaurant asserted a right to reject nonconforming goods under Article 2. The jurisdiction follows the predominant-purpose test for mixed contracts. Which of the following is the strongest conclusion concerning the governing law?

  1. ACommon law governs because the restaurant primarily sought the company's professional redesign and installation expertise.
  2. BCommon law governs because services represented a substantial portion of the contract price.
  3. CArticle 2 governs because the transaction's predominant purpose was acquiring movable commercial equipment.
  4. DArticle 2 governs only the equipment provisions, while common law necessarily governs every service provision.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: C. Article 2 governs because the transaction's predominant purpose was acquiring movable commercial equipment.

Rationale

Article 2 governs because the transaction's predominant purpose was acquiring movable commercial equipment.

  • The $105,000 allocation to standard ovens, refrigerators, and ventilation equipment exceeds the $75,000 allocated to services, supporting a predominant purpose of acquiring goods.
  • Under the jurisdiction’s predominant-purpose test, Article 2 governs the mixed transaction as a whole, including the restaurant’s claim that the ventilation equipment did not conform.

Common law governs because the restaurant primarily sought the company's professional redesign and installation expertise.

  • The restaurant’s reason for selecting this company supports a services characterization, but the agreement’s larger allocation was for standard equipment available from other suppliers.
  • The promised redesign does not, by itself, make professional services the predominant purpose of the entire transaction.

Common law governs because services represented a substantial portion of the contract price.

  • Design, installation, and training account for $75,000 of $180,000, a substantial amount but less than the $105,000 allocated to equipment.
  • The predominant-purpose test asks which aspect predominates, not whether services are merely substantial.

Article 2 governs only the equipment provisions, while common law necessarily governs every service provision.

  • The jurisdiction applies the predominant-purpose test to the mixed contract rather than necessarily dividing it provision by provision.
  • Because acquiring movable equipment predominates here, Article 2 governs the transaction, not just its equipment provisions.

Topic: Governing law

Q2

A hotel hired a technology company to design a customized reservation platform and supply 40 standard touchscreen terminals for $240,000. The written agreement allocated $190,000 to platform design, data migration, employee training, and six months of technical support; it allocated $50,000 to the terminals. The hotel selected the company primarily because of its expertise in integrating software with the hotel's existing systems. After installation, the hotel alleged that the platform repeatedly lost reservations. The company argues that Article 2 governs and that the hotel accepted the platform by using it for three weeks. The jurisdiction applies the predominant-purpose test to mixed contracts. Which of the following is the hotel's strongest argument concerning the governing law?

  1. ACommon law governs because the transaction's predominant purpose was obtaining specialized design, integration, training, and support services.
  2. BArticle 2 governs because the agreement included movable terminals and any inclusion of goods controls the entire transaction.
  3. CArticle 2 governs because the hotel used the completed platform for three weeks after installation.
  4. DCommon law governs because customized software can never qualify as a good under Article 2.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: A. Common law governs because the transaction's predominant purpose was obtaining specialized design, integration, training, and support services.

Rationale

Common law governs because the transaction's predominant purpose was obtaining specialized design, integration, training, and support services.

  • Under the jurisdiction’s predominant-purpose test, the agreement is classified by its overall purpose rather than by any one component.
  • The $190,000 allocated to services, compared with $50,000 for terminals, and the hotel’s reason for hiring the company support a service-dominant transaction.

Article 2 governs because the agreement included movable terminals and any inclusion of goods controls the entire transaction.

  • The 40 standard touchscreen terminals are goods, but their inclusion does not automatically make Article 2 govern a mixed contract.
  • The terminals account for $50,000 of the $240,000 price, while the larger allocation covers design, migration, training, and support.

Article 2 governs because the hotel used the completed platform for three weeks after installation.

  • Three weeks of use may matter to a dispute about acceptance or remedies, but it does not determine the contract’s predominant purpose.
  • Governing law turns on the transaction the parties agreed to, including the service-heavy price allocation and the hotel’s need for integration expertise.

Common law governs because customized software can never qualify as a good under Article 2.

  • The claim that customized software can never qualify as a good is too categorical.
  • The hotel’s stronger argument does not require classifying the platform in isolation: the agreement as a whole predominantly called for specialized services.

Topic: Governing law

Q3

A produce wholesaler and a grocery store orally agreed that the wholesaler would sell the store 500 crates of oranges for $8,000, with delivery within two weeks. That same day, the store's manager sent the wholesaler a signed memo confirming the quantity, price, and delivery date. The wholesaler received the memo, read it, but did not respond. Three days later, the wholesaler refused to deliver, and the store sued for breach. The wholesaler contends the oral agreement is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds because it never signed any writing. Both parties are merchants. Which of the following is the strongest conclusion concerning enforceability?

  1. AThe contract is enforceable against the wholesaler because it received a signed confirmatory memo sufficient against the sender and failed to object in writing within ten days.
  2. BThe contract is unenforceable because the Statute of Frauds requires a writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought.
  3. CThe contract is enforceable because oral agreements for the sale of goods are enforceable regardless of price when both parties are merchants.
  4. DThe contract is unenforceable because the store's memo was not signed by the wholesaler and therefore cannot satisfy the Statute of Frauds as to the wholesaler.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: A. The contract is enforceable against the wholesaler because it received a signed confirmatory memo sufficient against the sender and failed to object in writing within ten days.

Rationale

The contract is enforceable against the wholesaler because it received a signed confirmatory memo sufficient against the sender and failed to object in writing within ten days.

  • Under UCC § 2-201(2), the store’s signed memo confirming the 500 crates, $8,000 price, and delivery date satisfies the Statute of Frauds against the merchant wholesaler if it does not object in writing within ten days of receipt.
  • The wholesaler’s refusal to deliver three days later is not itself the required written objection.

The contract is unenforceable because the Statute of Frauds requires a writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought.

  • A signature by the party being sued is the general rule under UCC § 2-201(1).
  • The merchant-confirmation exception allows the store’s signed memo to satisfy the requirement against the wholesaler without its signature.

The contract is enforceable because oral agreements for the sale of goods are enforceable regardless of price when both parties are merchants.

  • The $8,000 sale exceeds the $500 threshold for the goods Statute of Frauds.
  • Merchant status does not make oral goods contracts enforceable regardless of price; the store relies on its signed confirmation.

The contract is unenforceable because the store's memo was not signed by the wholesaler and therefore cannot satisfy the Statute of Frauds as to the wholesaler.

  • UCC § 2-201(2) permits a confirmation sufficient against its sender to satisfy the Statute of Frauds against a merchant recipient.
  • Because the store signed the memo, the wholesaler’s missing signature does not defeat enforcement if it fails to object in writing within ten days.

Topic: Defenses to enforceability

Criminal Law and Constitutional Protections of Accused PersonsAll 64 Criminal Law and Constitutional Protections of Accused Persons questions →

Q1

Police arrested a warehouse employee for a completed theft and brought her to a station interview room. Before any criminal charge or court appearance, officers gave complete Miranda warnings, and the employee stated that she understood them. She then said, "I might need a lawyer if this gets serious." An officer replied, "The decision is yours," and asked whether she had taken the missing equipment. She confessed. No threats or promises were made, and the interview lasted 20 minutes. Defense counsel moves to suppress the confession under both Miranda and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Is the court likely to grant the motion?

  1. AYes, because any reference to a lawyer requires officers to stop questioning a suspect who has received Miranda warnings.
  2. BYes, because the arrest automatically attached the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for the theft investigation.
  3. CNo, because the statement was voluntary and a waiver may be implied without a signed writing.
  4. DNo, because the employee made no unambiguous request for counsel and adversarial judicial proceedings had not begun.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: D. No, because the employee made no unambiguous request for counsel and adversarial judicial proceedings had not begun.

Rationale

No, because the employee made no unambiguous request for counsel and adversarial judicial proceedings had not begun.

  • “I might need a lawyer if this gets serious” was not an unambiguous request for counsel, so Miranda did not require officers to stop questioning.
  • The Sixth Amendment right had not attached because the employee had not been charged or brought before a court.

Yes, because any reference to a lawyer requires officers to stop questioning a suspect who has received Miranda warnings.

  • Miranda requires officers to stop questioning after an unambiguous request for counsel, not every reference to a lawyer.
  • The employee’s conditional statement did not clearly ask for counsel before the officer asked about the equipment.

Yes, because the arrest automatically attached the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for the theft investigation.

  • Arrest alone does not attach the Sixth Amendment right to counsel; adversarial judicial proceedings must begin.
  • The employee was questioned before any criminal charge or court appearance.

No, because the statement was voluntary and a waiver may be implied without a signed writing.

  • A signed waiver is unnecessary, and answering after understanding the Miranda warnings can imply a waiver.
  • But voluntariness and implied waiver alone do not resolve whether the lawyer reference required questioning to stop or whether the Sixth Amendment right had attached.

Topic: General principles of criminal liability

Q2

A warehouse employee learned that a coworker planned to set fire to a storage shed containing outdated inventory after closing in order to collect insurance proceeds. Wanting the arson to succeed, the employee texted the coworker the alarm code and explained that the security guard usually left at 10:15 p.m. The coworker replied, “Perfect. I’ll do it tonight.” Before the coworker entered the warehouse, the employee became frightened and texted, “Forget it. I’m out.” The employee did not notify the warehouse or otherwise try to prevent the arson. The coworker entered using the code and set fire to the shed. The prosecution has charged the employee as an accomplice to the completed arson. Under generally accepted principles of accomplice liability, which of the following is the strongest conclusion?

  1. AThe employee is liable because the employee intentionally aided the arson and did not effectively withdraw before it occurred.
  2. BThe employee is not liable because the employee was not physically present when the coworker set the fire.
  3. CThe employee is not liable because the employee communicated withdrawal before the coworker entered the warehouse.
  4. DThe employee is liable only for solicitation because accomplice liability requires participation during the commission of the arson.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: A. The employee is liable because the employee intentionally aided the arson and did not effectively withdraw before it occurred.

Rationale

The employee is liable because the employee intentionally aided the arson and did not effectively withdraw before it occurred.

  • The employee supplied the alarm code and guard’s departure time to help the coworker commit arson, and the coworker used the code to enter.
  • Having already provided assistance, the employee’s “Forget it. I’m out” text did not neutralize that aid or otherwise prevent its use.

The employee is not liable because the employee was not physically present when the coworker set the fire.

  • Accomplice liability does not require physical presence when the crime occurs.
  • The employee intentionally helped beforehand by providing access information that the coworker used.

The employee is not liable because the employee communicated withdrawal before the coworker entered the warehouse.

  • The timing of the text alone did not make the withdrawal effective after the employee had supplied the alarm code.
  • The employee neither neutralized the code nor warned the warehouse or otherwise tried to prevent the arson.

The employee is liable only for solicitation because accomplice liability requires participation during the commission of the arson.

  • Precrime assistance can support accomplice liability for a completed offense.
  • The employee did more than encourage the coworker: the employee provided information that enabled entry and remained available for use despite the later text.

Topic: General principles of criminal liability

Q3

A defendant planned to steal electronics from a warehouse. He asked an acquaintance to serve as a lookout, obtained a crowbar, and drove them to the warehouse after it closed. The acquaintance remained in the car while the defendant walked to a rear entrance and inserted the crowbar between the door and its frame. Before damaging or opening the door, the defendant became frightened, returned to the car, and drove away. Police later identified both individuals from security-camera footage. The jurisdiction follows the substantial-step test for attempt and recognizes no statutory abandonment defense. If the defendant is prosecuted for attempted burglary, which of the following is the strongest conclusion?

  1. AThe defendant is guilty of attempt because he intentionally took a substantial step toward completing the burglary.
  2. BThe defendant is not guilty of attempt because he did not enter the warehouse or take any property.
  3. CThe defendant is not guilty of attempt because abandoning the plan before police intervention is a complete defense.
  4. DThe defendant is guilty only of solicitation because asking another person to help cannot constitute an attempt.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: A. The defendant is guilty of attempt because he intentionally took a substantial step toward completing the burglary.

Rationale

The defendant is guilty of attempt because he intentionally took a substantial step toward completing the burglary.

  • The defendant intended to enter the warehouse to steal electronics and inserted the crowbar between the closed door and its frame, strongly corroborating his criminal purpose.
  • Attempt requires a substantial step, not a damaged door or completed entry; his later departure does not erase the attempt.

The defendant is not guilty of attempt because he did not enter the warehouse or take any property.

  • Entry would be needed to complete the burglary, but it is not required for attempted burglary.
  • Taking property was his intended crime inside the warehouse, not a prerequisite to liability for attempting to enter it.

The defendant is not guilty of attempt because abandoning the plan before police intervention is a complete defense.

  • The jurisdiction recognizes no statutory abandonment defense, regardless of whether police had intervened.
  • By the time he became frightened and drove away, inserting the crowbar at the door had already supplied the substantial step.

The defendant is guilty only of solicitation because asking another person to help cannot constitute an attempt.

  • Asking the acquaintance to serve as a lookout may support solicitation, but it was not the defendant’s only conduct.
  • His own act of placing the crowbar between the warehouse door and frame independently supports attempted burglary.

Topic: Arrest, search and seizure

EvidenceAll 48 Evidence questions →

Q1

A pedestrian sued a delivery company after one of its vans struck her in a crosswalk. The company disputes whether the pedestrian entered the crosswalk against the signal. The pedestrian offers testimony from a traffic engineer that, during an inspection conducted two weeks after the collision at the same time of day, a tree partially blocked drivers’ view of the pedestrian signal. Weather records show that there had been no storm or pruning between the collision and inspection, and photographs taken on both dates show the tree in substantially the same condition. The company objects that the inspection occurred after the collision and that the testimony may cause jurors to decide the case based on a different event. The pedestrian offers the testimony to show what the driver could see when approaching the crosswalk. Is the court likely to admit the testimony?

  1. AYes, because the inspection conditions were shown to be substantially similar, and the testimony is probative of the driver’s ability to see the signal.
  2. BYes, because relevant evidence cannot be excluded merely because it may influence the jury’s assessment of a disputed fact.
  3. CNo, because observations made after an accident are inadmissible unless the opposing party attended the inspection.
  4. DNo, because the later inspection creates unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs its probative value.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: A. Yes, because the inspection conditions were shown to be substantially similar, and the testimony is probative of the driver’s ability to see the signal.

Rationale

Yes, because the inspection conditions were shown to be substantially similar, and the testimony is probative of the driver’s ability to see the signal.

  • The engineer’s observation is probative of visibility because the photographs show the tree in substantially the same condition on the collision and inspection dates.
  • The absence of storms or pruning supports admitting the later observation; the two-week gap goes to its weight.

Yes, because relevant evidence cannot be excluded merely because it may influence the jury’s assessment of a disputed fact.

  • The testimony is relevant because it helps establish what the driver could see when approaching the crosswalk.
  • But relevant evidence can be excluded under Rule 403 if a qualifying danger substantially outweighs its probative value.

No, because observations made after an accident are inadmissible unless the opposing party attended the inspection.

  • The company’s attendance is not a prerequisite to admitting the engineer’s observations.
  • The pertinent question is whether conditions at the later inspection were sufficiently similar to those at the collision.

No, because the later inspection creates unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs its probative value.

  • Jurors drawing an inference about visibility from the engineer’s testimony is its proper evidentiary use, not unfair prejudice.
  • The substantially unchanged tree supports probative value, and the record identifies no Rule 403 danger that substantially outweighs it.

Topic: Relevance and exclusion of evidence

Q2

A delivery driver sued a warehouse owner after a loading-platform railing collapsed. Two days after the accident, the owner replaced the railing and added warning signs. At trial, the owner denies owning the platform and contends that a neighboring business controlled it. The driver offers the owner's work order directing employees to replace "our damaged platform railing." The driver states that the work order is offered only to prove ownership and control, not negligence or culpable conduct. The owner objects that evidence of repairs made after an accident is inadmissible. Which of the following best states how the court should rule?

  1. AExclude the work order because evidence of a subsequent repair is inadmissible for every purpose.
  2. BAdmit the work order because ownership or control is disputed and the evidence is offered for that permitted purpose.
  3. CExclude the work order unless the driver first proves that the owner acted negligently before making the repair.
  4. DAdmit the work order as proof that the original railing was defective because the repair acknowledges the defect.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: B. Admit the work order because ownership or control is disputed and the evidence is offered for that permitted purpose.

Rationale

Admit the work order because ownership or control is disputed and the evidence is offered for that permitted purpose.

  • Rule 407 permits evidence of a subsequent remedial measure to prove ownership or control when that issue is disputed.
  • The owner denies controlling the platform, and the work order’s reference to “our damaged platform railing” bears on that dispute; the court may limit the jury to that use.

Exclude the work order because evidence of a subsequent repair is inadmissible for every purpose.

  • Rule 407 does not bar subsequent-repair evidence for every purpose.
  • Because the owner disputes ownership and control, the driver may offer the work order on those issues rather than to prove negligence.

Exclude the work order unless the driver first proves that the owner acted negligently before making the repair.

  • Rule 407 imposes no requirement that the driver first prove negligence to use the work order for disputed control.
  • The driver’s stated purpose is to show who controlled the platform, not whether the owner acted negligently.

Admit the work order as proof that the original railing was defective because the repair acknowledges the defect.

  • Rule 407 does not permit the driver to use the replacement as proof that the original railing was defective.
  • The work order may be considered for disputed ownership or control, but the repair cannot be treated as an admission of liability.

Topic: Relevance and exclusion of evidence

Q3

A corporation’s general counsel asked an outside accounting consultant to help counsel understand technical billing records so that counsel could provide legal advice concerning a threatened fraud suit. Employees sent the consultant records and explanations at counsel’s direction, and the consultant sent counsel a confidential analysis. After suit was filed, the corporation voluntarily produced the consultant’s analysis to the opposing party to support a settlement position but withheld the employees’ underlying communications. The opposing party moves to compel those communications, arguing that production of the analysis waived attorney-client privilege for all communications concerning the billing dispute. The governing waiver rule provides that an intentional disclosure in a federal proceeding extends to undisclosed communications only when they concern the same subject matter and fairness requires consideration together. Which of the following is the corporation’s strongest response?

  1. AThe underlying communications remain protected because communications involving nonlawyer consultants cannot fall within attorney-client privilege.
  2. BThe underlying communications remain protected because voluntary disclosure can waive privilege only if made during testimony at trial.
  3. CThe underlying communications must be produced because disclosure of any privileged communication automatically waives privilege over the entire dispute.
  4. DThe underlying communications remain protected unless they concern the same subject matter and fairness requires their consideration with the disclosed analysis.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: D. The underlying communications remain protected unless they concern the same subject matter and fairness requires their consideration with the disclosed analysis.

Rationale

The underlying communications remain protected unless they concern the same subject matter and fairness requires their consideration with the disclosed analysis.

  • Counsel engaged the consultant to help provide legal advice, so the consultant’s involvement does not necessarily defeat privilege for the employees’ communications.
  • Producing the analysis does not automatically waive privilege for those communications: the governing rule requires both the same subject matter and fairness requiring consideration together.

The underlying communications remain protected because communications involving nonlawyer consultants cannot fall within attorney-client privilege.

  • A nonlawyer consultant working at counsel’s direction to help counsel understand technical records may participate in privileged communications.
  • The corporation’s stronger argument concerns the limited scope of waiver after it produced the analysis, not a categorical exclusion of consultants from privilege.

The underlying communications remain protected because voluntary disclosure can waive privilege only if made during testimony at trial.

  • The corporation voluntarily produced the analysis to the opposing party, so waiver is not limited to trial testimony.
  • The issue is whether that disclosure also reaches the withheld employee communications under the governing subject-matter-and-fairness rule.

The underlying communications must be produced because disclosure of any privileged communication automatically waives privilege over the entire dispute.

  • Disclosure of the analysis does not automatically waive privilege over every communication about the billing dispute.
  • The opposing party must show that the withheld communications concern the same subject matter and that fairness requires considering them with the disclosed analysis.

Topic: Presentation of evidence

Real PropertyAll 40 Real Property questions →

Q1

Two siblings own a warehouse as tenants in common, each holding a one-half interest. Without consulting the other sibling, one sibling signed a five-year lease purporting to lease the entire warehouse to a furniture company. The company took possession and changed the locks. The nonleasing sibling promptly demanded a key and access to store inventory in unused space. The company refused, asserting that its lease gives it exclusive possession during the five-year term. The nonleasing sibling has not agreed to the lease or previously surrendered possession. Which of the following is the most appropriate advice to the furniture company?

  1. AThe lease is void because one tenant in common cannot transfer any possessory right without the other cotenant's consent.
  2. BThe lease transfers the owner's possessory rights, but the tenant cannot exclude the other cotenant from concurrent possession.
  3. CThe lease gives the tenant exclusive possession of the entire warehouse because each cotenant owns an undivided interest in the whole.
  4. DThe lease transfers only a right to occupy one-half of the warehouse because the owner held a one-half ownership interest.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: B. The lease transfers the owner's possessory rights, but the tenant cannot exclude the other cotenant from concurrent possession.

Rationale

The lease transfers the owner's possessory rights, but the tenant cannot exclude the other cotenant from concurrent possession.

  • A tenant in common may lease that cotenant’s possessory rights without the other cotenant’s consent.
  • The furniture company takes those rights subject to the nonleasing sibling’s concurrent right to possess the whole warehouse, so it must allow access.

The lease is void because one tenant in common cannot transfer any possessory right without the other cotenant's consent.

  • The leasing sibling could transfer that sibling’s own possessory rights without consulting the other sibling.
  • The lease is therefore not void, though it cannot extinguish the nonleasing sibling’s right of possession.

The lease gives the tenant exclusive possession of the entire warehouse because each cotenant owns an undivided interest in the whole.

  • An undivided interest gives each sibling a right to possess the whole warehouse, not a power to exclude the other.
  • The furniture company cannot use the lease to justify changing the locks and refusing access to the nonleasing sibling.

The lease transfers only a right to occupy one-half of the warehouse because the owner held a one-half ownership interest.

  • A one-half ownership interest is an undivided interest, not a designated half of the warehouse.
  • Without a partition, the furniture company’s transferred possessory rights and the nonleasing sibling’s rights extend concurrently throughout the property.

Topic: Rights in real property

Q2

A buyer signed a written contract to purchase a residential parcel. The contract required the seller to convey marketable title by general warranty deed, “subject only to zoning restrictions and recorded utility easements.” Before closing, a title search disclosed a recorded easement allowing the neighboring owner to use a driveway across the rear 20 feet of the parcel. The buyer had not previously known of the easement, which is not a utility easement. The seller refuses to obtain a release, arguing that the driveway is convenient, occupies little space, and does not prevent residential use. The buyer has not accepted a deed and asks whether the buyer must close. Which of the following is the most appropriate advice?

  1. AThe buyer must close because any recorded land-use right is treated as accepted when the buyer signs a sales contract.
  2. BThe buyer must close because a beneficial easement cannot create a reasonable risk of litigation or impair marketability.
  3. CThe buyer may rescind only if the neighbor’s use physically prevents construction of a residence on the property.
  4. DThe buyer may refuse to close because the unexcepted driveway easement is an encumbrance that makes title unmarketable.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: D. The buyer may refuse to close because the unexcepted driveway easement is an encumbrance that makes title unmarketable.

Rationale

The buyer may refuse to close because the unexcepted driveway easement is an encumbrance that makes title unmarketable.

  • The contract permits only zoning restrictions and recorded utility easements, but the neighbor’s recorded driveway easement is neither.
  • Because the buyer has not accepted a deed, the buyer may refuse to close if the seller cannot convey the promised marketable title.

The buyer must close because any recorded land-use right is treated as accepted when the buyer signs a sales contract.

  • Recording gives notice of the driveway easement, but it does not add that easement to the contract’s permitted exceptions.
  • The buyer agreed to accept recorded utility easements, not every recorded right affecting the parcel.

The buyer must close because a beneficial easement cannot create a reasonable risk of litigation or impair marketability.

  • The seller’s view that the driveway is convenient does not eliminate the neighbor’s enforceable right to use the rear 20 feet.
  • An unexcepted easement encumbers title even if it occupies little space and leaves residential use possible.

The buyer may rescind only if the neighbor’s use physically prevents construction of a residence on the property.

  • The buyer need not show that the driveway prevents construction; the contract requires marketable title, not merely land suitable for a residence.
  • The neighbor’s unexcepted right to cross the parcel is the title defect, regardless of whether a house can be built elsewhere on it.

Topic: Rights in real property

Q3

A brother and sister acquired a cabin by a deed conveying the property "to Brother and Sister as joint tenants with right of survivorship." Several years later, without telling his sister, the brother executed and delivered a valid deed conveying all his interest in the cabin to an investor. The investor paid fair value and promptly recorded the deed. The sister remained in possession and continued paying one-half of the property expenses. The brother died six months later. No agreement restricted either sibling's ability to transfer an interest, and no applicable statute changes the common-law consequences of the conveyance. The sister now asserts that she owns the entire cabin by survivorship, while the investor claims a one-half interest. Which of the following best states the parties' present ownership interests?

  1. AThe investor and the sister each hold a one-half tenancy in common, and the brother retains no ownership interest.
  2. BThe investor and the sister are joint tenants because one joint tenant's conveyance does not affect the surviving tenant's right of survivorship.
  3. CThe sister owns the entire property because the brother's later death activated her right of survivorship in his one-half interest.
  4. DThe investor owns the entire property because the recorded deed transferred both the brother's interest and the sister's survivorship interest.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: A. The investor and the sister each hold a one-half tenancy in common, and the brother retains no ownership interest.

Rationale

The investor and the sister each hold a one-half tenancy in common, and the brother retains no ownership interest.

  • The brother’s valid lifetime deed transferred his one-half interest to the investor and severed the joint tenancy, leaving the investor and sister as tenants in common.
  • Because the brother had conveyed all his interest before he died, his death transferred nothing by survivorship.

The investor and the sister are joint tenants because one joint tenant's conveyance does not affect the surviving tenant's right of survivorship.

  • A joint tenant’s conveyance to a third party severs the joint tenancy as to the conveyed share.
  • The investor and sister therefore hold separate one-half interests as tenants in common, not as joint tenants.

The sister owns the entire property because the brother's later death activated her right of survivorship in his one-half interest.

  • The brother’s deed extinguished the sister’s survivorship right in his share before his death.
  • Her continued possession and payment of one-half of the expenses did not undo that conveyance.

The investor owns the entire property because the recorded deed transferred both the brother's interest and the sister's survivorship interest.

  • The brother could convey only his own one-half interest, not the sister’s interest.
  • Recording the deed gave notice of the investor’s purchase but did not enlarge what the brother conveyed.

Topic: Titles

TortsAll 66 Torts questions →

Q1

A beverage manufacturer filled and sealed a glass bottle containing a hairline crack that was not visible without specialized testing. A commercial distributor received the sealed bottle, stored it properly, and sold it to a grocery store without changing it. When a consumer opened the bottle in an ordinary manner, the bottle shattered and cut her hand. Experts agree that the crack existed when the bottle left both the manufacturer and the distributor and that the crack caused the break. The consumer asserts a strict products-liability claim against the distributor. Which of the following is the strongest conclusion?

  1. AThe distributor is strictly liable because every commercial seller in the distribution chain guarantees that a product will cause no injury.
  2. BThe distributor is strictly liable if the bottle was defective when it left the distributor and the defect caused the user's injury.
  3. CThe distributor is not strictly liable because only the manufacturer can be responsible for a defect introduced during manufacturing.
  4. DThe distributor is not strictly liable unless it knew of the defect and negligently failed to inspect the sealed bottle.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: B. The distributor is strictly liable if the bottle was defective when it left the distributor and the defect caused the user's injury.

Rationale

The distributor is strictly liable if the bottle was defective when it left the distributor and the defect caused the user's injury.

  • The hairline crack was a defect when the sealed bottle left the commercial distributor, and the bottle reached the consumer without substantial change.
  • The crack caused the bottle to shatter during ordinary opening and cut the consumer’s hand, satisfying causation without proof that the distributor knew of the crack.

The distributor is strictly liable because every commercial seller in the distribution chain guarantees that a product will cause no injury.

  • Commercial sellers can be strictly liable for defective products, but they do not guarantee that a product will cause no injury.
  • Liability here rests on the existing crack and its causal connection to the consumer’s cut, not merely on the fact that an injury occurred.

The distributor is not strictly liable because only the manufacturer can be responsible for a defect introduced during manufacturing.

  • Strict products liability can extend to a commercial distributor even though the crack originated before the distributor received the bottle.
  • The crack remained in the sealed bottle when the distributor sold it and caused the injury during ordinary opening.

The distributor is not strictly liable unless it knew of the defect and negligently failed to inspect the sealed bottle.

  • Knowledge or negligent inspection is not required for a strict products-liability claim against the commercial distributor.
  • The crack was not visible without specialized testing, but the claim turns on the defect’s presence when the bottle left the distributor and its role in causing the injury.

Topic: Intentional torts

Q2

A delivery driver was traveling 15 miles per hour above the posted limit when the driver approached a busy intersection. When the traffic light changed, the driver applied the brakes, but a negligently installed brake hose ruptured. The van entered the intersection and struck a pedestrian in a crosswalk. An accident reconstruction showed that, even with the ruptured hose, the van would have stopped before the crosswalk if it had been traveling at the posted speed. The pedestrian sued both the driver and the delivery company. The driver argues that the unexpected brake failure eliminates any causal connection between the speeding and the pedestrian's injury. Which of the following is the pedestrian's strongest response?

  1. AThe driver's speeding was a factual and proximate cause because a collision of this general type was among the risks created by speeding.
  2. BThe driver's speeding was only a factual cause because the unusual brake failure necessarily superseded the driver's negligence.
  3. CThe driver's speeding was not a factual cause because the delivery company, rather than the driver, maintained the van.
  4. DThe driver's speeding was not a proximate cause because the precise sequence involving the brake hose was not foreseeable.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: A. The driver's speeding was a factual and proximate cause because a collision of this general type was among the risks created by speeding.

Rationale

The driver's speeding was a factual and proximate cause because a collision of this general type was among the risks created by speeding.

  • The reconstruction establishes factual cause: despite the ruptured hose, the van would have stopped before the crosswalk at the posted speed.
  • Striking a pedestrian after failing to stop is the general type of harm that makes speeding dangerous, even though the brake failure contributed to it.

The driver's speeding was only a factual cause because the unusual brake failure necessarily superseded the driver's negligence.

  • The brake failure does not necessarily supersede the speeding when both contributed to the van's inability to stop.
  • The reconstruction shows the speeding remained an operative cause: at the posted speed, the van would have stopped despite the rupture.

The driver's speeding was not a factual cause because the delivery company, rather than the driver, maintained the van.

  • The company's maintenance responsibility does not erase the driver's separate contribution from traveling 15 miles per hour over the limit.
  • Factual causation turns on what would have happened without the speeding, and the reconstruction shows the van then would have stopped.

The driver's speeding was not a proximate cause because the precise sequence involving the brake hose was not foreseeable.

  • Proximate cause does not require the driver to foresee the precise brake-hose rupture.
  • The relevant foreseeable risk is that speeding toward a busy intersection can leave a van unable to stop before striking a pedestrian.

Topic: Intentional torts

Q3

A company manufactured a countertop blender with a removable safety guard covering its blades. The blender was safe when sold with the guard installed, and the instructions prominently warned users not to operate it without the guard. A restaurant manager removed the guard because doing so made cleaning faster and directed an employee to continue using the blender. The employee knew that the guard had been removed and that the blades were exposed. While the employee was blending food, an internal metal bracket unexpectedly fractured, causing the container to detach and the exposed blades to cut the employee. An expert determined that the bracket contained a manufacturing flaw when it left the company's control. In the employee's strict-products-liability action against the company, which of the following is the strongest conclusion?

  1. AThe company is not liable because the blender was substantially changed after it left the company's control.
  2. BThe company is not liable because the employee knowingly encountered the danger created by the missing guard.
  3. CThe company is liable only if it failed to exercise reasonable care while manufacturing the metal bracket.
  4. DThe company may be liable if the bracket defect factually and proximately caused the injury despite the guard's removal.
Show answer and rationale

Answer: D. The company may be liable if the bracket defect factually and proximately caused the injury despite the guard's removal.

Rationale

The company may be liable if the bracket defect factually and proximately caused the injury despite the guard's removal.

  • The expert found a manufacturing flaw in the bracket that existed when the blender left the company’s control.
  • Liability depends on whether the bracket’s fracture caused the container to detach and whether the resulting cut was within the scope of the risk created by that defect, despite the missing guard.

The company is not liable because the blender was substantially changed after it left the company's control.

  • The manager removed the guard after sale, but the bracket’s preexisting flaw was a separate possible cause of the injury.
  • Guard removal does not automatically defeat a claim if the employee can establish that the bracket defect factually and proximately caused the cut.

The company is not liable because the employee knowingly encountered the danger created by the missing guard.

  • The employee knew the blades were exposed, but that knowledge does not establish awareness of the latent bracket flaw.
  • Using the unguarded blender may affect recovery under applicable defenses, but it does not automatically eliminate a claim based on the bracket defect.

The company is liable only if it failed to exercise reasonable care while manufacturing the metal bracket.

  • Strict products liability does not require proof that the company was careless in manufacturing the bracket.
  • The employee must instead establish that the bracket was defective when it left the company’s control and that the defect caused the injury.

Topic: Strict liability

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